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 MOVING FORWARD BY LOOKING BACK: THE 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF OBERGEFELL 
LEE-FORD TRITT* 
 
The recent Supreme Court decision of Obergefell v. Hodges has forever altered 
American jurisprudence. Not only did this decision make same-sex marriage legal in all 
fifty states, but it also required states to recognize same-sex marriages from other states 
in accordance with the 14th Amendment. The Court’s holding in Obergefell raises a 
fundamental question with serious legal and financial significance: when exactly do 
these once unrecognized marriages legally begin? And to what extent must courts apply 
Obergefell retroactively? The stakes are high and substantive financial effects are 
pending on the answer to this question—for, with marriage, comes wide-ranging rights 
and obligations. The decision will predominately impact the realm of real property law, 
property succession law, employment benefits, and family law. There currently are, 
and will continue to be, complicated lawsuits concerning the potential retroactive 
vestment of marital property rights for same-sex married couples, which may also 
impact third parties such as purchasers, mortgagees, and title insurers. Unfortunately, 
the Obergefell decision provided no guidance on its retroactive application. Therefore, 
this Article articulates and defends a rich positive and normative jurisprudential 
framework through which to analyze the rapidly growing number of real property, 
trusts and estates, and employment benefits disputes that continue to be initiated in the 
wake of the Obergefell decision. More importantly, this Article will proffer specific, 
effective, and tailored remedies to resolve subtle, but important, variances in these 
rapidly growing number of disputes. This Article is the first to examine the retroactivity 
of Obergefell as it applies to trusts and estates and property issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When does a same-sex marriage begin?1 In Obergefell v. Hodges,2 
the United States Supreme Court held that state laws “exclud[ing] 
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions 
as opposite-sex couples” were unconstitutional.3 The Court’s decision 
brought welcome clarity to a heavily debated question that has divided 
the nation for the better part of three decades. Following the Court’s 
 
 1.  The author has spoken about this question on many occasions since 2014. 
See Lee-ford Tritt, Professor of Law, Univ. of Fla. Coll. of Law, Address at the 48th 
Annual Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning: Because it Wasn’t 
Complicated Enough—Estate Planning Issues for Same-Sex Couples in the Wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions (January 2014); see also Lee-ford Tritt & Patrick J. 
Duffey, Windsor’s Wake: Non-Traditional Estate Planning Issues for Non-Traditional 
Families, 48 HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶¶ 1100, 1101.2 (2014). 
 2.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was a consolidation of six cases from 
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee involving fourteen same-sex couples and 
two widowers from same-sex marriages who were either denied marriage licenses or 
recognition of their out-of-state marriages. Id. at 2593. 
 3.  Id. at 2604–05.  
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holding, same-sex marriage became legal in every state. Amidst the 
celebration and criticism that followed Obergefell, though, the Court’s 
answer to a second question went largely unnoticed. Obergefell’s 
second question—“whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State 
to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State 
which does grant that right”4—was also conclusively answered in the 
affirmative. 5  While there has been extensive and rigorous dialogue 
debating the doctrinal reasoning, jurisprudential soundness, and 
practical implications of Obergefell’s first question, Obergefell’s second 
question has been overwhelmingly ignored. Yet, the Court’s holding 
raises a fundamental question with serious legal and financial 
significance: when exactly do these once unrecognized, but lawfully 
licensed, marriages legally begin?  
The answer to that question has implications beyond mere 
academic inquiry, regardless of whether these marriages begin on the 
date of the Obergefell decision, retroactively on the date of the 
marriage ceremonies, or on prospective dates selected by state 
legislative bodies. The stakes are high and substantive financial effects 
hinge upon the answer to this question—for, with marriage, comes 
wide-ranging rights and obligations. Moreover, the practical relevance 
of many of these marital rights and obligations are inescapably 
intertwined with the length of the marriage. The effects of Obergefell’s 
second question will cascade into virtually every legal venue, from tax 
to contracts, from bankruptcy to divorce, and from parentage issues to 
spousal immunity concerns in criminal law. Though far-reaching, the 
decision will predominately impact the realm of state property  
laws—particularly real property and property succession. 6  There 
currently are, and will continue to be, complicated lawsuits concerning 
the potential retroactive vestment of marital property rights for same-
sex married couples, which may also impact third parties such as 
purchasers, mortgagees, and title insurers. Unfortunately, the 
Obergefell decision provided no guidance on its retroactive application. 
In an effort to fill that jurisprudential chasm, this Article articulates and 
defends a rich positive and normative jurisprudential framework 
through which courts and legislatures might analyze the rapidly 
 
4.  Id. at 2593. 
 5.  Id. at 2607–08 (holding that “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse 
to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its 
same-sex character”). 
 6.  There will be serious implications concerning parentage issues as well. 
For purposes of this Article, though, parentage issues will be limited to their impact on 
property law. Accordingly, the family law implications will be outside the scope of this 
Article. For a discussion concerning Obergefell and its implications in the realm of real 
estate, see Andrea B. Carroll & Christopher K. Odinet, Gay Marriage and the Problem 
of Property, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2016). 
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growing number of real property and property succession disputes that 
continue to be initiated in the wake of the Obergefell decision. More 
importantly, this Article proffers specific, effective, and tailored 
remedies to resolve subtle, but important, variances in the rapidly 
growing number of disputes.  
A concrete example is a helpful tool to grasp the abstract 
intricacies of this subject in a meaningful way. 7  Towards that end, 
consider Louise and Thelma,8 who have been in a committed same-sex 
relationship since the early nineties. In 1998, they had a commitment 
ceremony celebrating their relationship and thereafter registered as 
domestic partners under the applicable state law. They were both 
domiciled in Massachusetts in 2004 at the time of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.9 
Shortly after the Goodridge decision, Louise and Thelma got married. 
The following year, they had a child whom they named “John David” 
or “J.D.” for short. J.D. was conceived using artificial reproductive 
technology and Louise was artificially inseminated using donor sperm. 
Thelma did not adopt J.D., and instead relied on the marital 
presumption for parentage purposes.10 In 2010, Thelma accepted a job 
in Texas and moved there with Louise and J.D. At the time, Texas was 
a non-recognition state11 and a community property state.12 In 2014, 
Thelma was killed by a drunk driver and died without a will. She was 
survived by her mother, Louise, and J.D. Probate began on Thelma’s 
estate along with a wrongful death lawsuit against the drunk driver. 
Thelma’s mother claimed to be Thelma’s sole heir,13 but Louise and 
J.D. also claimed to be Thelma’s heirs. After Thelma’s death, 
Obergefell held laws prohibiting the recognition of lawful same-sex 
 
 7.  See generally Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶ 1101.2. 
 8.  Louise is pretty tired of her name always coming second.  
 9.  798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that “barring an individual 
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that 
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution”). 
 10.  Under American common law, a child born during a marriage is 
presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. 
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 110 (9th ed. 2013). 
 11.  A somewhat idiosyncratic vocabulary was adopted to describe the various 
state laws that concerned same-sex marriages. The terms “recognition state” and “non-
recognition state” describe a given state’s policy on respecting extra-jurisdictional 
same-sex marriages. 
 12.  There are two basic marital property systems in the United States: 
community property and separate property. Under separate property systems, spouses 
own all earnings and acquisitions from earnings separately during marriage. Under 
community property systems, spouses own all earnings and acquisitions from earnings 
during marriage in equal and undivided shares. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 10, 
at 512.  
 13.  Heirs are those persons designated under applicable state law to inherit an 
intestate share in the property of another following the latter’s death. Id. at 544.  
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marriages from sister states to be unconstitutional. In order to resolve 
the multiple issues implicated in this example, a court must now 
determine when Texas should consider Louise and Thelma’s once 
unrecognized marriage as legal—should recognition begin retroactively 
on the actual date of their commitment ceremony, the day they 
registered as domestic partners, the day of their Massachusetts 
marriage, or on the date of the Obergefell decision?14 
In resolving the various retroactivity issues arising in the wake of 
Obergefell, two distinct questions must be considered. First, to what 
extent, and in which situations, should Obergefell be applied 
retroactivity as to choice-of-law considerations, if at all? Second, if 
Obergefell is to be applied retroactively, are there any limitations or 
judicial restraints in its application as a remedial principle? 
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions seem rife with 
contradiction and complexity. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the 
deference to, and limitations of, the retroactivity doctrine is a predicate 
to its application to Obergefell. 
First, the general rule when a federal or state statute is held 
unconstitutional is that the invalidated statute is thereby deemed void ab 
initio—or, “null from the beginning.”15 This, of course, makes sense in 
the context of a constitutional republic such as ours because legislative 
bodies lack the power to make such laws; an unconstitutional law is, by 
definition, an ultra vires (non-)exercise of legislative authority. 
Accordingly, the current stance held by federal courts is that these 
judicial rulings should be retrospective and should apply to events that 
predate those judgments. 16  Moreover, while many of these  
post-Obergefell disputes will concern the application of the retroactivity 
doctrine to the customary domain of state laws, the Supremacy Clause 
 
 14.  The retroactive application of Obergefell to previously unrecognized, but 
lawfully married, same-sex spouses will have multiple lifetime and death-time issues on 
the spouses, children, and third parties. Lifetime issues may include community 
property (when did it arise and how to treat any lifetime transfers of community 
property), previously filed state income taxes, divorce, marital property and equitable 
distributions, alimony, child custody, and visitation rights. Note that some of these 
issues will also depend on how long the couple will be deemed married. Death-time 
issues may include who is entitled to any award from the wrongful death claim, who 
are the proper heirs under intestacy, who has standing in testate estates, when did 
community property begin to accrue, homestead, elective share, family property set-
asides, insurance, pensions, employee benefits, previously filed estate and gift taxes, 
and if there are adequate remedies for property that may have already sold or 
distributed. Parentage issues may include whether J.D. was considered Thelma’s child 
during her lifetime and her heir at her death. Finally, third parties, such as innocent 
bona fide purchasers of property and title insurers, may also be impacted by the above 
issues. 
 15.  Void ab initio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For a 
discussion on void ab initio, see infra Part II.B. 
 16.  See infra Part II.C. 
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of the United States Constitution17 dictates that state courts retroactively 
apply a Supreme Court decision in the choice-of-law context.18 
Second, the application of the doctrine of retroactivity to remedial 
considerations must also be considered—and this application is more 
complicated and may lead to inconsistent judicial limitations in 
fashioning adequate remedies to post-Obergefell state law disputes. In 
the application of retroactivity to remedial considerations, the Court has 
recognized concern for a need of finality in litigation, which may be 
achieved through such procedural rules as res judicata, statutes of 
limitation, and laws requiring parties aggrieved by a law to provide 
timely notice of their objection. 19  For instance, in post-Obergefell 
disputes, pertinent statutes of limitations may have run, or property 
may have been sold to innocent third-party bona fide purchasers who 
relied in good faith on the law as it stood at the time of the purchase. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has established a strong line of 
precedent to make whole the discrete groups who were victims of 
unconstitutionally discriminatory laws. 20  For those same-sex married 
couples who were denied marital property rights under now 
unconstitutional laws, retroactive application would be the only way to 
provide adequate relief. Therefore, a balancing test of the competing 
public policy concerns of the various parties, and their respective 
property interests, will surely be part of any judicial analysis 
concerning retroactive remedial considerations. Accordingly, even if 
Obergefell should be applied retroactively with respect to choice-of-law 
matters, adequate remedies may not be available for pre-Obergefell 
deprivations of marital property rights—whether accruing during the 
unrecognized portion of a same-sex marriage or upon the death of one 
of the same-sex spouses. 
In order to provide the background necessary to understand the 
retroactive application of Obergefell to choice-of-law matters and to 
appreciate potential limitations associated with remedial considerations 
thereto, Part I of the this Article provides a very brief exploration of 
the history of same-sex marriage in the United States, culminating in an 
exploration of the Obergefell decision. Next, Part II offers a primer on 
the important doctrinal issues involved in the Obergefell retroactivity 
debate, including a detailed examination of the federal courts’ existing 
retroactivity jurisprudence and limitations as a remedial measure; a 
 
17.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 18.  See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 754 (1995); Harper 
v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993); Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and 
Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 50 (2014).  
 19.  See Reynoldsville Casket Co., 514 U.S. at 755–56. 
20.  See infra Part II.F. 
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review of insightful analogous precedents of Trimble v. Gordon21 and 
United States v. Windsor;22 and a brief survey of effective remedies 
provided under similar contexts of other discriminatory laws that were 
held unconstitutional. Then, Part III analyzes the scope of Obergefell’s 
retroactivity for choice-of-law considerations concerning outstanding 
state law issues and proffers tailored remedies for specific and distinct 
issues that might arise in post-Obergefell disputes. Finally, the Article 
concludes that, on balance, Obergefell should apply purely retroactively 
as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial considerations, to the 
extent that adequate remedies may be fashioned to protect innocent 
third parties while rectifying the property deprivations of 
unconstitutionally unrecognized marriages. Accordingly, this Article 
aims—through a vigorous intellectual discourse of the various 
competing theories, interests, and considerations—to be a guiding 
source on the practical implications that will stem from the retroactive 
application of Obergefell to choice-of-law matters and to remedial 
considerations. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. A (Brief) Timeline of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States 
In order to better appreciate the impact of the Obergefell decision 
on the current legal landscape, it is instructive to briefly review the 
history of same-sex marriage in the United States.23 Therefore, what 
follows are selected excerpts of the development of the law surrounding 
same-sex marriage in the United States. 
The modern history of same-sex marriage in the United States is a 
relatively brief narrative, especially compared to other social and 
political movements that encompass evolving notions of equality. 
Perhaps surprisingly, many modern gay rights advocates did not always 
promote the notion of same-sex marriage.24 During the early days of the 
modern gay rights movement, activists ignored or downplayed the 
same-sex marriage topic because they thought the topic was too 
controversial, unobtainable, and fostered the notion of gays and 
lesbians assimilating to a heteronormative family paradigm.25 In fact, 
 
 21.  430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 22.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 23.  For a detailed account of the historical evolution of legal status of same-
sex marriage in the United States, see Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101–02. 
 24.  See Patrick J. Egan & Kenneth Sherrill, Marriage and the Shifting 
Priorities of a New Generation of Lesbians and Gays, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 229, 
229 (2005) (noting that same-sex marriage is a recent priority of gay advocates).  
 25.  Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: 
The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015). 
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the American narrative of the legal progression of same-sex marriage 
merely begins a little over two decades ago when the Hawaii Supreme 
Court decided Baehr v. Lewin.26 Prior to 2004, same-sex marriage was 
not performed in any United States jurisdiction. Since that time, various 
legal elements concerning same-sex marriages have been tested, 
including the licensing of same-sex marriages, the recognition of the 
validity of these licenses, and the recognition of extra-jurisdictional 
same-sex marriages. During this very brief time period, though, all of 
these interconnected legal components have been resolved. 
The relevant legal timeline of same-sex marriage in the United 
States begins in Hawaii in 1993. In Baehr, a lawsuit in which three 
same-sex couples argued that Hawaii’s prohibition of same-sex 
marriage violated the state constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court held 
that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the Equal 
Protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution. 27  The Hawaii 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a 
determination of whether the state could show a compelling reason for 
the justification of the same-sex marriage ban; 28  and the trial court 
judge rejected the state’s justifications for limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples.29 One ramification of the Baehr decision was immediate: 
the Hawaii State Legislature promptly proposed a constitutional 
amendment that expressly reserved to the legislature the power to 
relegate marriage to opposite-sex couples only—and Hawaii voters 
passed the amendment in 1998.30 
The Baehr decision had another direct, but more significant, 
repercussion: the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 31 
DOMA was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.32 Notably, at 
the time DOMA was enacted, neither same-sex marriage nor 
 
 26.  852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 27.  Id. at 581–82. 
 28.  Id. at 583. 
 29.  Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996). 
 30.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996). This amendment to the state’s 
constitution differed from future state constitutional amendments in that it did not 
proscribe an absolute prohibition on same-sex marriages but rather allowed the state 
legislature to decide. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. In 2013, the state legislature legalized 
same-sex marriage under the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act. S.B. 1 27th Leg. (Haw. 
2013). 
 31.  The Baehr case was specifically cited in the House Judiciary Committee’s 
report. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996). Concerned with both state and federal 
implications of the legalization of same-sex marriage, the stated purposes of the statute 
were (1) “to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” and (2) “to 
protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal 
recognition of same-sex unions . . . .” Id. at 2. 
 32.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).  
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polygamous marriage33 was legal in any state, territory, or possession 
of the United States. 34  Section 2 of DOMA was an exercise of 
Congressional discretion granted under Article IV, Section 1 of the 
United States Constitution, which is commonly called the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. 35  This section purported to grant states autonomy in 
choosing whether to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 
United States jurisdictions36 by providing an exception to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. Despite this protection, many states decided to seek 
additional protection under the judicially-created public policy 
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.37 Section 3 of DOMA 
restricted, for all federal purposes, the definitions of “marriage” and 
“spouse” to opposite-gender couples, even though at the time no states 
allowed or recognized same-sex marriage. 38  Moreover, the federal 
enactment of DOMA prompted state legislatures to enact reform 
measures that banned same-sex marriage and prohibited the recognition 
of legally married same-sex couples from sister states.39 
 
 33.  These two are the only two types of marriages that are facially restricted 
by the text of Section 3 of DOMA. The issue of polygamy has not been broadly 
addressed in the debate surrounding DOMA and, thus, will not be further addressed by 
this Article. 
 34.  For a brief history of same-sex marriage over the past forty years, see 
Richard Wolf, Timeline: Same-sex Marriage Through the Years, USA TODAY (June 26, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/24/same-sex-marriage-
timeline/29173703/ [https://perma.cc/C7K2-375U]. 
 35.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Specifically, the provision reads “Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 36.  As previously noted in this section, at the time of enactment, there were 
no such jurisdictions. See Wolf, supra note 34. 
 37.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(a)(1)(A) (2011) (“It is the public 
policy of the State of Arkansas to recognize the marital union only of man and 
woman.”).  
 38.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 
2419 (1996). Section 3 became the subject of most of the controversy surrounding the 
Act, and the challenged provision in United States v. Windsor. As states began to 
permit same-sex marriages, DOMA had the effect of creating two tiers of marriages: 
those that were recognized by the federal government and those that were not.  
 39.  In the immediate wake of DOMA’s enactment, several states passed 
“Baby DOMA” statutes that substantially mimicked the provisions of the Defense of 
Marriage Act. The states that enacted Baby DOMAs in 1996 included Alaska, ALASKA 
STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (1996); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (1996); 
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(1) 
(1996); Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (1996); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
23-2508 (1996); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (1996); Missouri, MO. REV. 
STAT. § 451.022 (1996) (amended 2001); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 
(1996); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (1997); South Carolina, S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-1-15 (1996); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996). Until 
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The next major landmark in the evolution of same-sex marriage in 
the United States was Baker v. State,40 where three same-sex couples 
sued the state of Vermont after being denied marriage licenses.41 The 
Vermont Supreme Court held that the denial of a marriage license to a 
same-sex couple violated the “common benefits” clause of the state 
constitution and ordered the legislature to extend marriage or at least 
the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. 42  The result was the 
nation’s first “civil union” legislation, which gave same-sex couples the 
choice to enter into a civil union with all of the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage—denying their relationships only the word 
“marriage.”43 
The year 2003 marked another milestone for same-sex marriage 
with the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.44 In Goodridge, Gay and 
Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) sued the Massachusetts 
Department of Health in the Massachusetts Superior Court on behalf of 
seven same-sex couples who had been denied marriage licenses. 45 
Under a rational basis review, the court held that the limitation of 
benefits—including marriage—to same-sex couples was a violation of 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Equal 
Protection Clause.46 On May 17, 2004, for the first time in American 
history, same-sex marriages were legally recognized in 
Massachusetts.47 
 
2007, many other states followed suit by enacting legislative statutes and constitutional 
amendments in order to ban same-sex marriages and provide for the non-recognition of 
extra-judicial same-sex marriages performed in other states. In 2007, South Carolina 
would become the last state to enact a constitutional same-sex marriage ban, although it 
had already banned same sex marriage by statute in 1996. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 
(2007). For a detailed timeline and an index of citations of all of the state legislative 
statutes and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, see Tritt & Duffey, 
supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101.1, 1109. 
 40.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
41.  Id. at 867–68. 
 42.  Id. at 886. 
 43.  Id.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2016). 
 44.  798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 45.  Id. at 949–50. 
 46.  Id. at 961. 
 47.  Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/us/massachusetts-
arrives-at-moment-for-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/56WX-XJ74]. It is 
worthy of reflection to note the first same-sex couples who were legally allowed to 
marry attained this right merely thirteen years ago and in only this one state. This 
restricted time period and limited numbers of affected same-sex married couples could 
have weighty legal repercussions in the Obergerfell retroactivity analysis. 
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In 2008, the California Supreme Court found California’s statutory 
ban on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional. 48  Soon after that 
decision, California voters passed Proposition 8, a state constitutional 
ban on same-sex marriage. 49  In 2010, the Northern District of 
California struck down Proposition 8, holding it to be 
unconstitutional.50 The case would later be heard in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as Perry v. Brown, 51  which 
upheld the holding, before Hollingsworth v. Perry52 was finally argued 
in front of the United States Supreme Court.53 
Following a similar judicial path, in 2008 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court found that statutes restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
violated the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 54  Later, in 
2009, the Connecticut legislature legalized same-sex marriage by 
adopting marriage statutes with gender-neutral language.55 
In 2013, the fight to legalize same-sex marriage challenged a 
federal law for the first time. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed56  a decision by the Southern District of New York, which 
found Section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional.57 A decision affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, where the surviving 
spouse of a same-sex married couple sought to claim the federal estate 
tax marital deduction, the United States Supreme Court ultimately 
heard a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA, which defined “marriage” 
and “spouse” as excluding same-sex partners for purposes of federal 
law.58 The Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 was an unconstitutional 
“deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth 
Amendment,” and that the Constitution prevents the federal government 
 
 48.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008). 
 49.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008). 
 50.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 51.  671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 52.  133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding petitioners did not have standing to 
appeal the district court’s ruling declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 947 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 
 55.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-20, -28a, -28b (2015). Also in 2009, the Iowa 
Supreme Court found the state’s statutory ban to be unconstitutional in Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009), and Vermont passed a statute authorizing 
same-sex marriage. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009). Over the next six years, many 
states would authorize same-sex marriage through judicial decisions, legislative actions, 
and popular votes. For a detailed timeline and an index of citations of all of the state 
court decisions, legislative statutes, and popular votes allowing same-sex marriage, see 
Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1101.1-.2. 
 56.  Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 57.  Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 58.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (citing Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)). 
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from treating same-sex marriages any differently from heterosexual 
marriages.59 Such differentiation, the Court reasoned, would “demean[] 
the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution 
protects.”60 Although it left the District Court’s holding undisturbed, 
the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perry.61 
On June 27, 2013, the day after Windsor, same-sex marriage was 
allowed in thirteen states. Immediately following Windsor, federal and 
state courts were flooded with litigation related to the decision. 
Tellingly, Tom Watts writes that “[t]he marriage[] equality cases may 
represent the first time in American legal history that a single 
constitutional question has been so rapidly and broadly litigated.” 62 
There were constitutional challenges in twenty-six states.63 In general, 
the challenges concerned either the inability of same-sex couples to 
obtain marriage licenses or a state refusing to recognize extra-
jurisdictional same-sex marriages.64 After the decision in Windsor, five 
federal circuit courts of appeal upheld district court decisions 
invalidating prohibitions on same-sex marriages,65 and one decision by 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ban on same-sex 
marriage. 66  Obergefell v. Hodges resulted from the consolidation of 
these cases.67 At the time of the Obergefell decision, thirty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage. 68  Of 
 
 59.  Id. at 2695–96. 
 60.  Id. at 2694. 
 61.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
62.  Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage 
Equality Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 52, 53 (2015). 
63.  State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay  
Marriage, 1994-2015, PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view. 
resource.php?resourceID=004857 [https://perma.cc/BK86-C5AX] (last updated Feb. 
16, 2016). 
 64.  Generally, provisions governing non-recognition of extra-jurisdictional 
same-sex marriages are fairly generic. Virtually all provide, in one way or another, that 
same-sex marriages performed outside the jurisdiction are void inside the jurisdiction 
and will not be recognized. However, some states went further—or are, at the very 
least, more express—in their non-recognition provisions. Georgia, uniquely, has a 
constitutional non-recognition provision that expressly bans divorce proceedings for 
same-sex couples. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 para. I(b) (2004). See also ALA. CONST. art. 
I, § 36.03 (2006), ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, §§ 1–3 
(2004), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (1997). 
 65.  Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 
F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 
760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Bishop v. 
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1230 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
 66.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014). 
67.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 68.  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
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these states, twenty-six allowed same-sex marriage by court decision, 
eight states by state legislative action, and three by popular vote.69 At 
the same time, thirteen states banned same-sex marriages. 70  Of the 
remaining states, twelve banned same-sex marriage by constitutional 
amendments or state statutes or a combination of both.71 
The idea of same-sex marriage gained a significant amount of 
support during a relatively short period of time. Spanning less than 
twenty-five years, the judicial system drastically changed the reality of 
same-sex relationships in the United States. It wasn’t until Obergefell, 
however, that the right to a same-sex marriage became fundamental. 
B. Obergefell v. Hodges 
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court limited its consideration to only 
two questions: “whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to 
license a marriage between two people of the same sex” and “whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex 
marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that 
right.”72 On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
opinion—exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in 
Windsor. Regarding the first question, the Court held that the denial of 
marriage to same-sex couples violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.73 In striking down state laws to 
the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the 
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples, the Court bound 
marriage to an individual’s dignity, liberty, and social status. 74 
Regarding the second question, the Court held that: 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry 
in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—and it 
now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to 
 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay 
Marriage, 1994-2015, supra note 63. In addition, eight Native American tribal 
jurisdictions permitted same-sex marriages. Tritt & Duffey, supra note 1, ¶ 1101.2. 
69.  State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay Marriage, 1994-
2015, supra note 63. 
 70.  Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. 
71.  Id. 
 72.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
73.  Id. at 2604. 
 74.  Id. at 2596. 
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refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in 
another State on the ground of its same-sex character. 75 
It must be noted that the Court also addressed the long-standing 
debate over the applicability of Baker v. Nelson.76 In Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court stated that “Baker v. Nelson must be and now is 
overruled.”77 
Although the Court was specific in answering the two limited 
questions before it, the Court unfortunately did not provide guidance 
concerning the retroactivity of its decision. In 2010, the United States 
Census Bureau estimated that there were 605,472 same-sex couples in 
the United States (less than one-half of one percent of all tax returns 
files), of which approximately 168,000 (27.8%) self-identified as 
married. 78  Of note, among the same-sex couples that identify as 
married, more than half (56% or approximately 94,000 couples) 
resided in states that did not recognize same-sex marriage.79 
Following the legalization of same-sex marriage, previously 
unrecognized same-sex spouses must wait to see what remedies will be 
available concerning the marital rights, protections, and benefits that 
were denied prior to Obergefell. For same-sex married couples who 
lived in non-recognition states before the Obergefell decision, when 
must these former non-recognition states recognize the establishment of 
their marriages—on the date of their marriage ceremony, on the date of 
the Obergefell decision, or another prospective date enacted by state 
 
75.  Id. at 2607–08. 
 76.  191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). This was a case in which two gay men 
applied for a marriage license in Minnesota. Id. at 185. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
ruled that a state limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex did not violate the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 187. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal question.” Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Because the case came to 
the Supreme Court through mandatory appellate review, the dismissal constituted a 
decision on the merits and established Baker v. Nelson as precedent. The extent of the 
precedential effect has been subject to debate.  
 77.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. Overruling Baker may play into any 
analysis concerning whether Obergefell created a new law or merely explained existing 
law concerning a fundamental right.  
 78.  See American Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples,  
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html 
[https://perma.cc/8SGL-86W2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (It is not known whether all 
who self-identified as married were legally married in a jurisdiction recognizing same-
sex marriages). 
 79.  See id.; see also Martin O’Connell & Sarah Feliz, Same-sex Couple 
Household Statistics From the 2010 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working 
Paper No. 2011-26, 2011), www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/decennial.html 
[https://perma.cc/965G-YW4V]. 
2016:873      The Retroactive Application of Obergefell 887 
legislative bodies? 80  In order to provide guidance to courts, state 
legislators, and legal practitioners, an exploration of the federal courts’ 
existing retroactivity jurisprudence and an examination of the how this 
jurisprudence has been applied as precedent under similar contexts is 
greatly needed. 
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RETROACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
An exploration of both the American retroactivity jurisprudence 
and analogous examples of its application and remedies are needed in 
order to develop an analytical framework for resolving retroactivity 
issues for post-Obergefell disputes. First, a cognitive analysis of 
Obergefell’s retroactive impact on choice-of-law matters and remedial 
considerations must begin with a comprehensive exploration of the 
applicable jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of retroactivity and any 
limitations thereto. Further, a review of Trimble and its progeny will 
provide insightful, pertinent, and analogous examples in order to tease 
out the nuances of potential remedial limitations concerning property 
transfers during life and at death. In addition, a review of Windsor and 
its retroactive application concerning federal marital rights and benefits 
to same-sex marriages will offer useful insights concerning post-
Obergefell retroactivity issues. Finally, a review of judicial remedies 
crafted and implemented following other discriminatory laws that were 
declared unconstitutional on account of affecting a discrete group of 
victims will provide a springboard for analyzing retroactive remedial 
considerations for post-Obergefell disputes. 
A. Judicial Decision-making 
The issuance of any judicial decision that declares a law 
unconstitutional raises critical questions regarding what the retroactive 
effect of the court’s holding should be,81 if any.82 Those questions are 
 
 80.  The language of the Obergefell decision notes “lawful same-sex 
marriages performed in other States.” 135 S. Ct. at 2585. If the quoted language means 
a state need not recognize a valid same-sex marriage performed in another country, 
obviously then May 17, 2004 would be the earliest possible date of recognition. 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
 81.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (3d ed. 
2000) (judicial decisions are said to have retroactive (or “retrospective”) effect where 
they govern claims rooted in facts antedating the decision). 
 82.  See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146 (2015) (“The United States Constitution 
neither requires nor prohibits retroactive or prospective application of a new decision, 
and the determination of whether a decision overruling a former decision should be 
applied retroactively or merely prospectively is generally a matter of judicial discretion 
to be applied on a case-by-case basis. In civil cases, the court may, in its equitable 
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particularly pronounced with respect to Obergefell. In efforts to 
anticipate how courts might handle some of these questions concerning 
post-Obergefell disputes, we must examine the possibilities in the 
context of the United States Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine. 
In general, a judicial decision can be applied to subsequent cases in 
a number of ways: (1) purely retroactively, whereby the rule of law 
announced by the decision is applied to all events which gave rise to the 
subsequent litigation; (2) partly retroactively, whereby the rule is 
applied to some, usually the primary, conduct which gave rise to the 
subsequent litigation; (3) selectively prospectively, whereby the rule 
may be applied retroactively to the parties before the court, but may be 
applied only prospectively to other parties in similar circumstances but 
whose cases are not pending; (4) purely prospectively, whereby the rule 
may only be applied to subsequent litigants whose cases arise from 
operative facts arising after the pronouncement of the rule; and, finally, 
(5) prospectively prospective, whereby a court chooses to delay the 
effect of the rule, applying it only to litigants after a certain period of 
time.83 
This spectrum of possible approaches raises a number of 
interesting questions, some of which go to the very heart of legal 
jurisprudence.84 For instance, Professor Laurence H. Tribe writes that 
the retroactivity doctrine is “a reflection of the applicable theory of 
lawmaking.”85 Justice Blackstone and Justice Scalia, for example, have 
opined that judicial decision-making should be the clarification of rules 
already in existence.86 This notion is rooted in the generalization that 
while legislatures make new law, courts merely interpret the law (or, 
rather, declare the law as it already stood). 
 
discretion, prohibit or limit retroactive operation of its ruling, where the overruled law 
has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden.”). 
 83.  See Kay, supra note 18, at 43–44; see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146. 
 84.  See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 233–35 (“The Court’s retroactivity decisions 
. . . reflect much deeper divisions about the process of adjudication generally—and 
deeper issues about what it means to decide a question of law . . . . Different models of 
the judicial process provide different perspectives on the problem of whether a decision 
should be given retrospective effect.”). 
 85.  Id. at 216. 
 86.  See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be 
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, 
which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than 
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”); 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69, 69 (15th ed. 1809) (explaining that the duty of the 
court is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”); see 
also Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 
YALE L.J. 907, 907 (1962). 
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This theory of judicial decision-making, though, may be 
oversimplified, and presents some logical problems. For example, if 
courts are only declaring what the law already was, then any limited 
application—any application outside of pure retroactivity—would seem 
a deprivation of justice.87 Under both Justices Blackstone and Scalia’s 
view, all parties to litigation ought to be able to take full advantage of 
the rule of law as newly interpreted, and have it apply to every event 
that has given rise to their dispute.88 Otherwise, the litigants are refused 
the benefits of the law simply because the courts struggled to timely 
arrive at their expression. 
Giving all parties such benefit may prove impracticable, though, in 
practice. Parties must rely on prior expressions of courts, and it is 
important to remember that new interpretations of the law are not made 
in a single-party vacuum. Thus, the retroactive recognition of one 
party’s right may be to the detriment of another party that had 
reasonably relied on a court’s prior expression of law. Accordingly, 
under both Justices Blackstone and Scalia’s view, retroactivity may be 
more of a normative view of the courts: a rule of thumb meant to 
combat judicial activism. 
The view that judges actually make new law is more realistic,89 
and far more accepted today.90 This view is often traced to Nineteenth 
 
 87.  1 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1:9 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“The issue of retroactivity of constitutional decisions has been contentious for the 
Supreme Court Justices. It strikes at the heart of the way in which they define their 
role. If judges who interpret the Constitution only apply existing law—and never 
‘make’ new law—then all of their decisions should be fully retroactive. If, however, the 
judicial role includes articulation of new rules, then restricting retroactivity makes good 
sense. It is unfair to those who reasonably relied upon existing law to subject them to 
rules and potential liability that they had no reason to anticipate.”). 
 88.  Justice Scalia has directly addressed the point in arguing that because the 
power of the judiciary is only to discern the law, and not to make new law, its decisions 
should always be applied retroactively, despite inevitable practical difficulties in certain 
circumstances. James Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia 
explained that while automatic retroactivity may give rise to practical difficulties when 
courts overrule precedent, “those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon 
judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to 
‘make new law,’ and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of 
responsibility and power among the three branches.” Id. 
 89.  Justice O’Connor, quoting Justice Frankfurter, has explained that “[w]e 
should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law . . 
. . It is much more conducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the 
considerations that give prospective context to a new pronouncement of law.” Harper 
v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 116–17 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 90.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (1991) (“It would be only 
a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians. The insistence that 
judges could simply find the true and timeless rule, uninfluenced by evolving moral 
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century legal positivist John Austin,91 who maintained that “judges do 
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially 
by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic 
statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of 
the law.”92 Indeed, this view is supported by language found across the 
Court’s modern jurisprudence. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas,93 
Justice Kennedy, who also authored Obergefell, closed the opinion by 
opining the following: 
 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have 
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary 
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles 
in their own search for greater freedom.94 
 
Exactly twelve years later in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy cited 
Lawrence, writing: 
 
If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then 
received practices could serve as their own continued 
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once 
denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with 
respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and 
lesbians.95 
 
The great debate regarding positivist versus declaratory judicial 
decision-making, along with questions regarding the proper role of the 
courts, the proper role of the legislature, and the nature of the law 
 
values and social policies, now seems anachronistic. Justice Harlan, for example, 
rejected Blackstone's jurisprudential claims even as he criticized the quasi-legislative 
approach to lawmaking that he detected in the Warren Court's non-retroactivity 
policy.”) (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 91.  See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
(1832), in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 1, 191 (1954). 
 92.  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1965) (comparing the views 
of Blackstone and Austin). 
93.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 94.  Id. at 578–79. 
 95.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
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itself, is ongoing. For now, though, we examine the doctrine of void ab 
intio and the interrelated retroactivity jurisprudence as it stands today, 
however disorganized. 
B. Void ab initio 
When a federal or state statute is declared unconstitutional, the 
general rule is that the statute is void ab initio, 96 meaning “null from 
the beginning.”97 In other words, the unconstitutional statute is wholly 
void and ineffective for any purpose. Since its unconstitutionality dates 
from the time of its enactment, and not from the date of the decision 
striking the statute, it is as if the statute had never been passed and had 
never existed. Once a statute is held to be void ab initio, private 
citizens and divisions of the state cannot take any further action 
pursuant to that statute’s provisions.98 
When such an act is held to be unconstitutional by a court and the 
general assembly fails to subsequently repeal, amend, or modify it, the 
act is no longer valid law.99 The void ab initio rule only applies to 
statutes that are facially unconstitutional, or those unconstitutional in all 
of their applications, and not to statutes that are unconstitutional only 
when applied to a certain set of facts.100 
The term was famously formulated in Norton v. Shelby County,101 
where the court held that “an unconstitutional act is not a law; it 
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it 
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though 
 
 96.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 195. (“The general rule is that an 
unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of 
law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose. Since 
unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of 
the decision so branding it, an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as 
inoperative as if it had never been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab 
initio.”).  
 97.  Void ab initio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 98.  Thomas v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 478 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996), aff’d, 485 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1997). 
 99.  People v. Taylor, 448 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the 
defendant’s conviction could not stand when, at the time of the defendant’s conviction, 
the statute under which he was convicted had not been amended to remedy a prior 
ruling that it was unconstitutional). 
 100.  See People v. Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (Ill. 2015); Lummi Indian Nation v. 
State, 241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010). But see Stavenjord v. Mont. St. Fund, No. 2000-
0207, 2004 WL 3093058 (Mont. Work. Comp. Ct. Aug. 27, 2004) (holding that the 
statute in question was only unconstitutional as applied, not on its face, and thus was 
not retroactive). 
 101.  118 U.S. 425 (1886) (applying a theory of void ab initio, following 
Blackstone’s declaratory view of judicial decision-making). 
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it had never been passed.”102 Since this time, the doctrine has been used 
with respect to everything from contracts signed under duress, to 
statutes that were found unconstitutional.103 
Generally, when a statute is held to be void ab initio, this decision 
should be applied retroactively. 104  Laws may change primarily by 
legislative or judicial action. Judicial action has proven more 
complicated than legislative action, as there is a distinction between 
judicial decisions that declare a statute unconstitutional and those that 
change established principles of common law. 105  This distinction in 
degrees of reliance is what dictates strict adherence to the void ab initio 
rule when a statute is declared unconstitutional, especially when applied 
to fundamental rights.106 When a statute is declared unconstitutional by 
a judiciary, the decision should apply retroactively.107 To do otherwise 
would violate due process under the United States Constitution and 
would prevent citizens who are guaranteed those rights under the 
Constitution from receiving a remedy for such a violation.108 However, 
courts have wrestled with the idea that sometimes it is necessary to 
uphold the validity of certain transactions or events that occurred before 
a statute was declared void ab initio. 109  Therefore, a review of the 
 
 102.  Id. at 442. 
 103.  See TRIBE, supra note 81 (“If an unconstitutional statute or practice 
effectively never existed as a lawful justification for state action, individuals convicted 
under the statute or in trials which tolerated the practice were convicted unlawfully 
even if their trials took place before the declaration of unconstitutionality; such a 
declaration should have a fully retroactive effect, and previously convicted individuals 
should be able to win their freedom through the writ of habeas corpus. Alternatively, if 
a judgment of unconstitutionality governs only the case at hand, the legality of the 
convictions of individuals previously tried is not affected.”). 
 104.  Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Trustees of 
Wofford Coll. v. Burnett, 209 S.E.2d 155, 159 (S.C. 1946); see also Atkinson v. S. 
Express Co., 78 S.E. 516, 519 (S.C. 1913) (“When a statute is adjudged to be 
unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; . . . it 
constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it . . . .”) (internal quotation 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
 105.  People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ill. 1990) (holding that only 
judicial decisions which declare a statute unconstitutional should be given retroactive 
effect). 
 106.  Id. at 287; Yakubinis v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 847 N.E.2d 552, 
558–59, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 107.  Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 289. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Herndon v. Moore, 18 S.C. 339, 352 (S.C. 1883) (applying the 
exceptional doctrine of communis error facit jus, or “common error makes right,” to 
hold the vast number of sales involving thousands of acres of land during a ten-year 
period by probate courts were valid even though probate courts were later determined 
not to have subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such sales because the statute granting 
such jurisdiction was held unconstitutional). 
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jurisprudence concerning retroactive applications of judgments and 
remedies is in order. 
C. The Retroactivity Doctrine 
The modern retroactivity doctrine began to evolve in the latter half 
of the twentieth century, although the doctrine and its limitations have 
been inconsistently applied by courts.110 Historically, the general rule 
has been that legislation is presumptively prospective in operation,111 
while judicial decisions are presumptively retroactive in operation.112 
Over time, though, the retroactivity doctrine has splintered into two 
separate jurisprudential avenues evolving around two distinct legal 
disciplines: criminal law and civil law. Because Obergefell is a civil 
case clearly addressing the denial of fundamental rights, this Article 
focuses on the prong of retroactivity surrounding civil law. 113 
 
 110.  The first true modern retroactivity decision, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U.S. 618 (1965), was decided on June 7, 1965. Criticism of the retroactivity doctrine 
has continued in the following decades. For a thorough overview of the history of the 
retroactive and prospective application of judicial decisions, see Bradly Scott Shannon, 
The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 811 (2003). See also, e.g., Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the 
Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, 
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 166 (2005) (“For the 
past forty years, the Court has struggled with these concerns, producing a lineage of 
cases that have generated varying reactions as to their efficiency and fairness . . . .”); 
Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative 
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1999) (“[Modern jurisprudence] has not 
freed itself from the difficulties that attended the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, and the 
current law of retroactivity is widely regarded as intellectually unsatisfactory. This is 
terribly ironic, for what has happened is that the concept of retroactivity has assumed 
greater prominence as part of an attempt to solve a problem that was created by the 
introduction of that very concept.”).  
 111.  See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146 (2015 & Supp. 2016). For an iteration 
of the Court’s stance on retroactive effect of legislation, see Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).  
 112.  See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 146. “Traditionally, ‘both the common law 
and [the Court’s] own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the 
constitutional decisions of [the] Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions . . . 
.’” TRIBE, supra note 81 (quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973)); see 
also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 84, 106–07 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(discussing the lengthy history of retroactivity of judicial decisions). But see Bouie v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353, 355 (1964) (“[A]n unforeseeable judicial 
enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex 
post facto law . . . . [T]he effect is to deprive [the defendant] of due process of law in 
the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime.”). 
 113.  The remainder of this Article will deal with retroactivity in the civil 
context. For a comparison of the criminal and civil retroactivity doctrines, see Pamela 
J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515 (1998); see also Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary 
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In this civil context, the modern test was established in 1971 in 
Chevron Oil v. Huson,114 where the Court established a three-factor test 
to decide whether a judgment should deviate from the norm of 
retroactivity afforded to civil cases. 115  While pretrial discovery was 
underway in Chevron Oil, 116  the Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. 117  Rodrigue held that under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act),118 federal law supplemented 
by a state’s statutes of limitations applied to cases of personal injury 
that occurred on artificial island drilling rigs.119 Chevron Oil arose from 
a personal injury suit under the Lands Act as well, and the Court had to 
decide whether the suit was barred because the case was brought after 
Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations expired, even though 
admiralty law was the governing precedent at the time of the case’s 
filing, not the one year statute of limitations.120 
The Court determined that retroactivity may be denied (1) to a 
“new principle of law . . . on which litigants may have relied,” (2) if 
such limitation would avoid “injustice or hardship” and (3) it would not 
unduly undermine the “purpose and effect” of the new rule.121 After an 
examination of these factors, the Court held that “[b]oth a devotion to 
the underlying purpose of the Land Act’s absorption of state law and a 
weighing of the equities requires nonretroactive application of the state 
statute of limitations here.”122 
The Court’s three-factor Chevron Oil test governed for many 
years. However, in 1990, the Court’s plurality opinion in American 
Trucking v. Smith123 signaled a shift in the current civil retroactivity 
 
Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmkaing, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145 (1996); 
TRIBE, supra note 81. 
 114.  404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
 115.  Id. at 106–07. 
116.  Id. at 99. 
 117.  395 U.S. 352 (1969). 
 118.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356 (2012). 
 119.  Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355. 
 120.  Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98–99. 
 121.  Id. at 106–07. (“First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must 
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution 
was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must . . . weigh 
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in 
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or 
retard its operation.’ Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive 
application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable 
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 
injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.’”) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quotations omitted).  
 122.  Id. at 109. 
 123.  496 U.S. 167 (1990). 
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doctrine. 124  In American Trucking, the Court framed the issue as 
whether the Court’s previous decision in American Trucking 
Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner,125 which held state application of flat 
highway use taxes unconstitutional,126 would be “applie[d] retroactively 
to taxation of highway use prior to the date of that decision” that had 
occurred in Arkansas as a result of the state’s Highway Use 
Equalization tax.127 As Professor Jill E. Fisch noted, the Court decided 
that the “retroactive application of the earlier decision invalidating 
certain highway use taxes under the Commerce Clause would unfairly 
burden the state’s current operations and future plans made in reliance 
on the tax revenues collected.”128 
Importantly, the plurality emphasized that “retroactivity of 
decisions in the civil context ‘continue[d] to be governed by the 
standard announced in Chevron Oil.’”129 The plurality continued: 
 
The principles underlying the Court’s civil retroactivity 
doctrine can be distilled from both criminal and civil cases 
considering this issue. When the Court concludes that a law-
changing decision should not be applied retroactively, its 
decision is usually based on its perception that such 
application would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those 
who relied on prior law. In order to protect such reliance 
interests, the Court first identifies and defines the operative 
conduct or events that would be affected by the new decision. 
Lower courts considering the applicability of the new 
decision to pending cases are then instructed as follows: If the 
operative conduct or events occurred before the law-changing 
decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time 
of the conduct. If the operative conduct or events occurred 
after the decision, so that any reliance on old precedent would 
be unjustified, a court should apply the new law.130 
 
 
 124.  Id.; Stephens, supra note 113, at 1530. 
 125.  483 U.S. 266 (1987). Throughout the remainder of the article, “American 
Trucking” shall represent the Smith case, and this case shall be represented as 
“Scheiner.”  
126.  Id. at 269. 
 127.  American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 171. 
 128.  Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1060–61 (1997); see also American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 
182–83. 
 129.  American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 178 (alternation in original) (quoting 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987)). 
 130.  Id. at 191 (citations omitted). 
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The plurality applied the Chevron Oil three-factor test and held 
that each weighed in favor of non-retroactivity. 131  Justice O’Connor 
wrote that “[i]t is . . . a fundamental tenet of [the Court’s] retroactivity 
doctrine that the prospective application of a new principle of law 
begins on the date of the decision announcing the principle.”132 
However, Justice Stevens, in his dissent in American Trucking in 
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined, 
“distinguish[ed] between retroactivity as a choice-of-law rule and 
retroactivity as a remedial principle.”133 Justice Stevens explained: 
 
A decision may be denied “retroactive effect” in the sense 
that conduct occurring prior to the date of decision is not 
judged under current law, or it may be denied “retroactive 
effect” in the sense that independent principles of law limit 
the relief that a court may provide under current law. . . . 
This case, which comes to us from state court, requires us for 
the first time to expressly distinguish between retroactivity as 
a choice-of-law rule and retroactivity as a remedial 
principle.134 
 
As Professor Laurence H. Tribe explains, “Justice Stevens argued 
that the Chevron Oil factors are relevant only as equitable 
considerations in deciding what type of relief is appropriate, not in 
determining what law to apply in the first instance.”135  In the end, 
though, American Trucking “left unresolved the precise extent to which 
the presumptively retroactive effect of this Court’s decisions may be 
altered in civil cases.”136 
Doubts about Chevron Oil resurfaced in James B. Beam Distilling 
Co. v. Georgia. 137  James Beam dealt with the issue of selective 
prospectivity, i.e., the practice of applying a newly announced rule to 
particular litigants in front of the court but making the rule otherwise 
 
 131.  See id. at 179–83 (The plurality focused on factor three, “the equities of 
retroactive application of Scheiner,” the most. They decided that it would be too large 
of a burden on the state of Arkansas to provide relief and that retroactive application 
“would be unjust”). 
 132.  Id. at 187. 
 133.  TRIBE, supra note 81, at 220 (emphasis removed). 
 134.  American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 209–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 135.  TRIBE, supra note 81, at 220–21 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality rejected this argument, writing: “While application of the 
principles of retroactivity may have remedial effects, they are not themselves remedial 
principles.” American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 195–96 (Justice O’Connor explained that 
“Chevron Oil is better understood as part of the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than as 
part of the law of remedies”). 
 136.  Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993). 
 137.  501 U.S. 529, 532, 536 (1991). 
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prospective for future litigants. 138  The case produced five separate 
opinions, none of which garnered more than three votes, but a majority 
(six) of the justices did rally around the idea of rejecting selective 
prospectivity and three of those six rejected the idea of prospectivity 
entirely.139 Justice Souter, delivering the judgment of the Court, and 
joined in his opinion by Justice Stevens, concluded that once the Court 
has applied a rule of law to litigants in one case, it must do so with 
respect to all similarly situated litigants not barred by procedural 
requirements or res judicata.140 
Also of note, Justice Souter appeared to draw the same distinction 
between choice-of-law and remedial considerations drawn by Justice 
Stevens in American Trucking.141 Justice Souter opined that whether a 
new rule should apply retroactively is in the first instance a matter of 
choice of law. But, “[o]nce a rule is found to apply ‘backward,’” he 
wrote, “there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the 
 
138.  Id. at 532, 536. James Beam involved the question of whether a 1984 
holding by the court, Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), declaring 
a Hawaiian excise tax on imported alcohol unconstitutional, should apply retroactively 
to a similar Georgia tax (even though it was repealed in 1985) and entitle those seeking 
relief to a refund for taxes paid pre-1984. Id. 
 139.  Justices Blackmun, Marshal, and Scalia rejected prospectivity entirely. 
See James Beam, 501 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 548 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 545–46 (White, J., concurring). Justice Souter, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, was joined by Justice Stevens, and rejected selective prospectivity 
stating: “Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law.” Id. at 540–41. Justice White 
also delivered a concurring opinion rejecting selective prospectivity, but differed from 
other concurring opinions in that he believed Griffith had been wrongly decided. Id. at 
545–46 (White, J., concurring). 
 140.  Id. at 540. 
 141.  Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted) (rejecting selective prospectivity, Justice 
Souter argued that: “Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes 
retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, 
the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the 
particular case. Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is 
chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. The applicability of 
rules of law are not to be switched on and off according to individual hardship; 
allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the 
stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very development of 
‘new’ rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the 
courts to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly 
situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities 
when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.” Justice Souter expounded on this 
conclusion by adding: “The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are 
confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the Court has applied a new rule of 
law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by 
procedural requirements or res judicata. We do not speculate as to the bounds or 
propriety of pure prospectivity. Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may be 
appropriate in this case . . . .”). 
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party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that 
would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one.”142 
Finally, the Court again addressed the issue of retroactivity in 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation. 143  Harper involved a 
Virginia statute that exempted retirement benefits paid by state and 
local governments from taxation, but did not exempt retirement benefits 
paid by the federal government.144 A similar Michigan statute was held 
unconstitutional in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury.145 The 
Virginia Supreme Court refused to apply the Davis decision to cases 
brought by persons who had paid tax on federal retirement benefits 
before Davis was decided.146 On appeal, the high court decided that 
Virginia had to give effect to the holding in Davis, but that did not 
mean that the plaintiff taxpayers were entitled to refunds. 147 Rather, the 
state was obligated to “provide relief consistent with federal due 
process principles.”148 In the context of a decision where a state statute 
attempted to levy an unconstitutional tax, the due process requirement 
may be met by affording the taxpayer a “predeprivation hearing” 
allowing the taxpayer to challenge the tax before paying it. In the 
absence of such a remedy, the state must provide “backward-looking 
relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation.”149 
In the end, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that although 
Virginia law did allow taxpayers to bring a declaratory judgment action 
to review the constitutionality of laws imposing taxes, no taxpayer 
would think that such an action provided the only remedy because 
Virginia’s statute required refunds of illegally collected taxes.150 The 
declaratory judgment was not an adequate “predeprivation” remedy and 
the taxes paid under the void statute had to be refunded.151 
In Harper, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, recognized 
that “Griffith and American Trucking . . . left unresolved the precise 
extent to which the presumptively retroactive effect of this Court’s 
decisions may be altered in civil cases.”152 The Court then discussed 
 
 142.  Id. at 535. 
 143.  509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
144.  Id. at 90–91. 
 145.  489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
146.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 91. 
147.  Id. at 100. 
148.  Id. (quoting American Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181 
(1990)). 
 149.  Id. at 100 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & 
Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)). 
150.  Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 462 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1995). 
 151.  Id. at 899. 
 152.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 96. 
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James Beam, finding that, while James Beam had not produced a 
unified opinion, it had seen a majority of justices agree on a rule: 
 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal 
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still 
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of 
the rule.153 
 
The Court, invoking Justice Stevens’s American Trucking dissent 
and adopting a hard position reflecting a majority of the justices in 
James Beam,154 elaborated: 
Regardless of how Chevron Oil is characterized, our decision 
today makes it clear that “the Chevron Oil test cannot 
determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the 
particular case” and that the federal law applicable to a 
particular case does not turn on “whether [litigants] actually 
relied on [an] old rule [or] how they would suffer from 
retroactive application” of a new one.155 
The Court then continued: “In both civil and criminal cases, we 
can scarcely permit ‘the substantive law [to] shift and spring’ according 
to ‘the particular equities of [individual parties’] claims’ of actual 
reliance on an old rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the 
new rule.”156 
As Professor Tribe explains, in Harper, “[t]he Court expressly 
endorsed the view of the dissent in American Trucking that ‘[t]he Court 
has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in criminal cases 
to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated litigants 
differently.’”157 Professor Tribe further explains, “[T]he Court did not 
hold that all decisions of federal law must necessarily be applied 
retroactively. . . . [T]he Court has not renounced the power to make its 
decisions entirely prospective . . . .”158 Thus, while the Court appeared 
hostile to non-retroactivity generally, Chevron Oil, which dealt with 
pure prospectivity, was not in fact overruled.159 Instead, “the majority 
 
 153.  Id. at 97. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 95 n.9 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 
529, 543 (1991)). 
 156.  Id. at 97 (quoting James Beam, 501 U.S. at 543). 
 157.  TRIBE, supra note 81, at 226 (quoting Harper, 509 U.S. at 97). 
 158.  TRIBE, supra note 81, at 226. 
 159.  Kay, supra note 18, at 48. 
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opinion forbade only ‘selective prospectivity,’ in which a court applies 
the new rule to the parties before it but not to other conduct predating 
the court’s judgment.”160 
Through Harper, the Court had essentially created a presumption 
of retroactivity.161 “Left unclear,” Professor Pam Stephens suggests, 
“are the circumstances under which such a presumption might be 
overturned—when might the Court reserve such a determination, how 
would the decision whether to afford retroactive application be made 
(by what standard) and is pure prospectivity therefore still an 
option.”162 
Justice Breyer shed some light on the meaning of Harper in the 
majority opinion of Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 163  a decision 
issued by the Court in 1995.164 Hyde, an Ohio resident, was injured in 
an accident involving a truck owned by an out-of-state company. 165 
Although she brought her action after the two-year Ohio statute of 
limitations had ran, the suit was still timely because under an Ohio 
statute the statute of limitations is tolled while a person against whom a 
cause of action accrues is out of the state.166 While Hyde’s action was 
pending, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.167 that the Ohio tolling provision 
violated the Commerce Clause and was unconstitutional.168 After the 
Ohio trial court and intermediate appellate court dismissed her case, 
Hyde appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court which reinstated it, holding 
that Bendix could not be applied retroactively to claims in state courts 
that had “accrued” before the announcement of the Bendix decision.169 
In a decision delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court unanimously 
held that the federal Constitution does not permit this tolling to occur to 
pre-Bendix torts.170 Plaintiff Hyde attempted to frame the issue of the 
case not as one of retroactivity, but as one of remedy, when he tried to 
persuade the Court that the tolling of the statute of limitations should be 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Stephens, supra note 113, at 1559. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  514 U.S. 749 (1995). 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. at 751. 
166.  Id. 
 167.  486 U.S. 888 (1988). 
168.  Id. at 889. 
169.  Reynolds Casket Co., 514 U.S. at 751–52. 
 170.  Id. at 750–51, 761 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Joining Justice Breyer 
were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. 
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice 
O’Connor joined. There was no dissent filed.). 
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seen “as a state law ‘equitable’ device.” 171  The Court rejected the 
notion that essentially prospective results could be achieved through 
remedial means and declared that “we do not see how . . . the Ohio 
Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that federal law, 
applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate simply 
by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a 
remedy.”172 The Court thus concluded that the rule in Bendix should be 
applied retroactively since the Bendix decision applied to the parties 
then before the Court, and, following the reasoning of the Harper 
decision, required that this rule also be applied to the Reynoldsville 
Casket plaintiff, Hyde.173 Under the rule, when state courts apply a new 
judge-made rule of federal law, the Supremacy Clause of the federal 
Constitution requires that they apply such a rule retroactively.174 
Justice Breyer also noted the “special circumstances” of tax cases 
in which remedies other than refunds of unconstitutionally collected 
taxes are possible. 175  For example in Harper, Virginia could have 
refunded taxes collected from federal pensioners or imposed back taxes 
on state and local pensioners. 176  Either would have satisfied the 
constitutional requirements of equal protection. Justice Breyer also 
noted that retroactivity can be defeated by another constitutionally 
adequate rule.177 Justice Breyer posited that “a pre-existing, separate, 
independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity—a 
rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund  
suit—nonetheless barred” the refund suit.178 
Ultimately, the Court held that state courts must give retroactive 
effect to decisions of federal law unless special circumstances exist.179 
The Court noted, however, that even where a new rule is applied 
retroactively to pending cases, there may be “instances where that new 
rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome 
of the case.”180 Specifically, a court may find: 
 
(1) [A]n alternative way of curing the constitutional violation, 
or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis (having 
nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief, or (3) . . . 
 
 171.  Id. at 753. 
 172.  Id. at 753–54. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 750–51, 754. 
 175.  Id. at 755. 
176.  See id. 
177.  See id. 
178.  Id. at 756. 
179.  Id. at 759. 
 180.  Id. at 758–59. 
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a well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule 
of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and 
other significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law 
. . . that limits the principle of retroactivity itself.181 
 
These limitations are not absolute in all civil litigation, however, 
as “[i]n rare cases parties may collaterally attack otherwise final 
judgments but only if the case is truly exceptional.”182 Both the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
express such an exception.183 The Court’s retroactive application of its 
holdings has always been limited by both the preclusion doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata as well as by statutes of 
limitations.184 
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Mitchell,185 a Texas case on 
retroactivity, Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Jefferson, in his 
dissenting opinion (on unrelated grounds), says “the Supreme Court 
explicitly overruled [the Chevron Oil test] as it applies to constitutional 
decisions and suggested that prospective application was not only wrong 
as to constitutional decisions, but contrary to the role of the 
judiciary.”186 Chief Justice Jefferson went on to note the concurring 
opinion by Justice Scalia in Harper on the issue of retroactive versus 
prospective application of decisions in which Scalia summarized the 
Court’s position succinctly as follows: “Prospective decision making is 
the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. 
. . . The true traditional view is that prospective decision making is 
quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no 
authority to engage in the practice.”187 
Although the retroactivity doctrine in civil cases might lack 
absolute clarity, in her article “The New Retroactivity Doctrine: 
Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis,” Professor Pam Stephens cites 
four rationales which have underlined the retroactivity doctrine over the 
 
 181.  Id. at 759. 
 182.  Kay, supra note 18, at 51. 
 183.  Id. at 52. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 
73(2) of the Restatement both suggest the availability of the option to alter the finality 
in civil litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 
73(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1980). This must be for “particularly compelling reasons” and 
“[a]t some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful civil litigants are denied 
the solace of newer and friendlier law.” Kay, supra note 18, at 52. 
 184.  Stephens, supra note 113, at 1568.  
 185.  276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008).  
 186.  Id. at 450. 
 187.  Id. at 451 (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105–
06 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted)). 
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years. 188  Perhaps these rationales may provide us some guidance in 
analyzing the aftermath of Obergefell, as these considerations may be 
what ultimately sway the Court in the face of revising its own 
doctrine.189 
First, Stephens explains that notions of fairness, and, more 
specifically, reliance largely supported Chevron Oil. 190  The same 
concerns underlay American Trucking.191 It was in Harper, however, 
that fairness focused on reliance interest was superseded by fairness 
focused on interests in equal treatment.192 Second, Stephens explains 
how the judiciary’s Article III powers—to decide cases and 
controversies—have given way to constitutional objections to 
prospectivity. 193  Of course, we have seen Justice Scalia oppose 
prospectivity on these grounds, 194  but Stephens argues that “despite 
Scalia’s arguments to the contrary, there is nothing in the text of Article 
III which defines the nature of the judicial role, nor the exact limits of 
the judicial power relative to the other branches.”195 Further, she points 
out, prospective decision-making has been traditionally used in this 
country; in fact, “the Court has suggested that such nonretroactive 
application of law might be constitutionally required in some 
instances.”196 Third, Stephens explains how stare decisis may provide a 
certain rationale for retroactivity.197 While Scalia has argued that stare 
decisis and non-retroactivity are essentially incompatible, Stephens 
points out: 
 
Proponents of some measure of prospectivity argue that in 
fact the purposes of the doctrine of stare decisis are served by 
not requiring retroactive application of all new rules. This is 
so because underlying the doctrine of stare decisis is the 
principle of protecting justifiable reliance upon established 
law. To the extent that a party has justifiably relied upon 
established law, and has no reason to anticipate a change in 
that law, refusing to apply a new rule of law to that party is 
consistent with stare decisis.198 
 
 
188.  Stephens, supra note 113, 1560–68. 
 189.  See generally id.  
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 1561. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 194.  Stephens, supra note 113, at 1563. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 1563–64. 
 197.  Id. at 1565. 
 198.  Id. 
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Stephens argues that it is indeed the “flexible application of the 
doctrine of stare decisis,” or an application that allows for the sudden 
abandonment of old rules where necessary, that “has allowed the law to 
evolve gradually in this country, accommodating changes in modern 
society, unrestricted by archaic rules.”199 Finally, Stephens notes the 
rationale of finality: 
 
In the civil area, the Court has usually dealt with the issue of 
finality implicitly, although it has on occasion stated its view 
in more explicit terms. The Court seems to have assumed that 
any retroactive application of its rulings is always limited by 
both the preclusion doctrines and by statutes of limitations. 
To the extent that a litigant is barred by collateral estoppel or 
res judicata from raising a particular issue or mounting a 
claim or defense, the litigant cannot take advantage of any 
new rule announced by the courts. Similarly, should the court 
announce a new rule of law that provides a cause of action 
where one did not exist before, a litigant may not take 
advantage of that to bring a case barred by the relevant statute 
of limitations. Again, underlying both the preclusion 
doctrines and statutes of limitations is in large part the notion 
that there must be an endpoint to litigation or to the 
possibility of litigation. In both the criminal and civil areas 
then, finality acts to put an outside limit on the scope of the 
retroactivity doctrine.200 
 
Stephens writes: 
[T]he new retroactivity doctrine is consistent with the Court’s 
more conservative view of the narrow role of the judiciary 
and the limits on the judicial power. By requiring judicial 
decisions to have retroactive application, the assumption is 
that courts will be less likely to overturn precedent—not 
wanting to adversely affect those who relied upon the old 
rule. Therefore, stare decisis will be more forcefully adhered 
to and judicial activism diminished.201 
In sum, when the Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct 
review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate 
 
 199.  Id. at 1567. 
 200.  Id. at 1568. 
 201.   Id. 
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or postdate the announcement of the law. Therefore, in the aftermath of 
Obergefell, it is undeniable that any precedent banning the recognition 
of same-sex marriages has been overturned as an unconstitutional denial 
of a fundamental right, and Obergefell should be applied purely 
retroactively for choice-of-law purposes. Operating under this 
assumption, we next turn to Trimble to provide an illustrative guide to 
the issues that arise concerning remedial limitations when dealing with 
familial relations, property, and retroactivity. 
D. Trimble v. Gordon and Retroactive Inheritance Rights202 
As courts begin to address how Obergefell will affect surviving 
spouses, families, and third parties—such as purchasers, mortgagees, 
and title insurers—Trimble v. Gordon203 and its progeny highlight the 
unique challenges of retroactive applications of remedial considerations 
to the state law legal disciplines of real property and property 
succession.204 These cases flesh out some of the remedial limitations 
that will be of issue in post-Obergefell disputes, as seen as recently as 
2004 in the case of Kau Agribusiness Co. v. Ahulau. 205  Although 
insightful in highlighting the unique nature of real property and 
property succession laws, it should be noted that Trimble was decided 
before the Supreme Court’s recent development of a more robust 
concept of retroactivity. Nevertheless, Trimble may still serve in 
developing a framework for analyzing remedial issues concerning 
Obergefell. A pattern of particular remedial problems begins to develop 
 
 202.  Although Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and its lineage may 
seem like the obvious precedent for the retroactivity of civil marriage laws, Loving does 
not make for the strongest analogy because Loving dealt primarily with penal statutes. 
Retroactivity jurisprudence is bifurcated into two jurisprudential lines: criminal and 
civil. See infra Part II.C. Resolving retroactivity issues concerning the Obergefell 
decision will implicate the civil line of judicial retroactivity jurisprudence. While 
Loving is a penal law case, it was the impetus for retroactive inheritance rights in at 
least two cases. See Dick v. Reaves, 434 P.2d 295, 298 (Okla. 1967) (in the context of 
an inheritance dispute, declaring an Oklahoma penal statute unconstitutional and 
overruling all contrary prior decisions in accordance with Loving, thereby creating a 
retroactive new class of heirs); Hibbert v. Mudd, 272 So. 2d 697, 700, 706 (La. Ct. 
App. 1972) (Culpepper, J., dissenting) (noting that although the lower court relied on 
Loving to invalidate a civil statute that banned miscegenous heirs from receiving their 
inheritance, “the Loving case applied to a penal statute and there could be a question as 
to whether it extends to civil statutes”), rev’d on other grounds, 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 
1974).  
 203.  430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
204.  Id. 
 205.  95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004). “After the application of Trimble to invalidate 
their own similar statutes, other state courts addressing the prospective/retroactive 
question have generally limited the retrospective reach of the statutory invalidation.” 
Id. at 622–23 (quoting Williamson v. Gane, 345 S.E.2d 318, 320 (W. Va. 1986)).  
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upon reviewing these cases, including whether estates have closed, 
whether applicable statute of limitations have run, and whether property 
has been transferred to innocent bona fide purchasers. 
In Trimble, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional state statutes 
that excluded a non-marital child from inheriting from the child’s 
biological father. 206  Various states unsuccessfully defended these 
statutes by claiming an interest in encouraging family relationships and 
in establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing of property 
at death. The Court held that although a state has a great deal of 
independence in determining how to govern the disposition of an estate, 
the state is still bound by constitutional limits.207 For a federal court, 
“[t]he judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional 
rights without interfering unduly with the State’s primary responsibility 
in this area.”208 For cases dealing with proof of paternity, the Court 
held that the difficulty in proving paternity was not so great as to justify 
unilaterally denying the inheritance rights of illegitimate children whose 
fathers died intestate.209 As one court noted, “a statutory classification 
based on illegitimacy violates equal protection unless it is substantially 
related to an important governmental interest.”210 The Court’s holding 
in Trimble gave rise to numerous claims by non-marital children and 
raised questions regarding Trimble’s retroactive effect on the intestacy 
laws of the states. 
1. RETROACTIVITY OF TRIMBLE 
Before the Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of its 
decision in Trimble, probate courts in different states reached various 
conclusions concerning the extent, if any, of the retroactivity of Trimble 
to property succession law. The Supreme Court of Appeals for West 
Virginia applied Trimble retroactively in Williamson v. Gane, 211  an 
intestate probate action concerning whether the decedent’s non-marital 
children were beneficiaries of the estate. 212  At the time of the 
decedent’s death, West Virginia law allowed non-marital children to 
inherit only from their mother’s estate, and therefore the decedent’s 
 
206.  Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.  
 207.  Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771 (1977).  
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. at 772.  
 210.  Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed Petitioner a fair opportunity to establish her kinship 
because the harsh discrimination against non-marital children did not sufficiently further 
the orderly administration of estates).  
 211.  345 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1986).  
212.  Id. at 320.  
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children were not deemed heirs at law. 213 Over two years after the 
decedent’s death, however, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Trimble. The sole question presented to the court in Williamson was the 
retroactive effect, if any, of Trimble upon the devolution of title to the 
intestate decedent’s real estate. 214  The court noted that the “United 
States Supreme Court has not addressed the prospective/retroactive 
question as it applies to the Trimble decision.”215 Regardless, the court 
applied Trimble retroactively and acknowledged the non-marital 
children as lawful heirs, finding that (1) there has been no justifiable 
and detrimental reliance upon the law invalidated therein, (2) the 
subject property has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for 
value, or (3) the estate is subject to further administration. 216  The 
Court’s definition of the Trimble test is significant here because it 
establishes guidelines that are beyond the limitations of paternity; 217 
these three criteria can be applied to any statute addressing the 
distribution of an estate and the retroactivity of a holding. 
Other state probate courts, however, reached alternative 
conclusions to the retroactive/prospective question regarding Trimble. 
For instance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina utilized a very 
restrictive application in Wilson v. Jones.218 In Wilson, the court settled 
upon a pure prospective application of Trimble by holding that only 
those non-marital children whose fathers die after the date of the 
Trimble decision may inherit.219 The Tennessee Supreme Court, on the 
other hand, retroactively applied its own decision, holding that a non-
marital child can inherit from the child’s father so long as paternity is 
proved “by clear and convincing evidence” and the other claimants 
have not relied to their detriment on prior law (in this case the court 
describes those other claimants as “merely assert[ing] that they have 
passively acquired rights as the heirs at law of an intestate property 
 
213.  Id. at 319. 
214.  Id. at 320. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. at 322; see also Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn. 
1984) (“[R]etroactive application of a decision overruling an earlier decision ordinarily 
is denied only if such an application would work a hardship upon those who have 
justifiably relied upon the old precedent.”). 
 217.  Williamson, 345 S.E.2d at 322. 
 218.  314 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 1984). See also Mitchell v. Hardwick, 374 S.E.2d 
681, 682 (S.C. 1988) The South Carolina Supreme Court held that Trimble should be 
given “limited retroactive application” where an innocent purchaser is not adversely 
affected by enforcing the new rule in the face of the purchaser’s reliance on the law 
existing at the time of the purchase, where paternity is “conclusively established,” and 
where the estate administration is subject to “further resolution.” Id. 
 219.  314 S.E.2d at 343. 
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owner,” not that they have relied on the prior law).220 Still, other courts 
accorded limitations on the retroactive effect by applying Trimble to 
matters pending on the date of the Trimble decision. 221  Finally, the 
Supreme Courts of Kentucky222 and Arkansas223 refused to give Trimble 
any retroactive effect. 
Adding to the retroactive/prospective chaos following Trimble, the 
United States Supreme Court deliberated the question in Reed v. 
Campbell,224 a case concerning a decedent who died intestate when the 
Texas Probate Code prohibited non-marital children from inheriting 
from their biological father’s estate. 225  Subsequent to the decedent’s 
death, the Court decided Trimble, thereby holding the Texas statute 
void ab initio.226 After Trimble, a non-marital child of the decedent filed 
a claim to a share in her father’s estate, but a Texas trial court denied 
the claim. 227  The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
Trimble does not apply retroactively. 228  Despite this, the Supreme 
Court of the United States applied Trimble retroactively in Reed and 
held: 
The interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out 
of wedlock, requires that appellant’s claim to a share in her 
father’s estate be protected by the full applicability of 
Trimble. There is no justification for the State’s rejection of 
the claim. At the time appellant filed her claim, Trimble had 
been decided, and her father’s estate remained open. Neither 
the date of the father’s death nor the date appellant’s claim 
was filed should have prevented the applicability of Trimble. 
Those dates, either separately or in combination, had no 
 
 220.  See Marshall, 670 S.W.2d at 215 (citing Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 
829 (1978)) The Tennessee statute governing inheritance by non-marital from their 
biological fathers was not as restrictive as the Illinois statute invalidated by Trimble 
and, arguably, was not overturned by Trimble. Id. 
 221.  See Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 497 (Ark. 1979); In re Estate of Rudder, 
397 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); In re Estate of Sharp, 377 A.2d 730 (N.J. Super. 
1977), aff'd as modified, 394 A.2d 381 (N.J. 1978); Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981). 
 222.  Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. 1978). 
 223.  Frakes, 583 S.W.2d at 499. 
 224.  476 U.S. 852 (1986). 
225.  Id. at 852–53. 
226.  Id. at 853. 
227.   Id. 
228.   Id. 
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impact on the State’s interest in orderly administration of the 
estate.229 
2. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 
Although a federal court’s decision may be given full retroactive 
effect, remedial considerations may be affected by whether “cases [are] 
still open on direct review.” 230  While this potential limit on the 
retroactivity of remedies provides a level of certainty to persons whose 
cases have reached a final point of adjudication, the limits also have 
practical considerations by preventing a case from being reopened with 
each subsequent change in the law.231 
These rules may be overlooked in extraordinary cases where an 
injustice will continue to be implemented if the decision is not revisited. 
Section 73(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment “may be set aside or 
modified if . . . [t]here has been such a substantial change in the 
circumstances that giving continued effect to the judgment is unjust.”232 
Despite the apparent wiggle room within the Restatement, the 
limitations of retroactivity seem best recognized as being barred by 
time: “retroactive effect of civil judgments reaches back only to 
controversies still open to judicial resolution.”233 
Although the Court’s decision in Reed resolved at least some of the 
retroactivity issues raised by Trimble, the Court did emphasize that the 
decedent’s estate had remained “open” at the time of the decision.234 
Therefore, “closed” estates may produce limitations concerning 
retroactive remedial considerations. Of course, discerning the 
differences between open and closed estates is not as easy as it might 
seem. Most estates are probably never formally closed, in the sense that 
the personal representative has accounted to the court, process has been 
issued to those interested, and the court has issued a decree approving 
the accounts and discharging the personal representative from further 
liability. 
 
 229.  Id. at 856. 
 230.  Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1993). 
 231.  Quatnum Res. Mgm’t, L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 112 So. 3d 209, 
217 (La. 2013) (denying the re-opening of a 1925 case based on a 1983 United States 
Supreme Court decision, Mennonite Bd. Of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)). 
 232.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73(2) (1982).This standard was 
recognized as being an “unsound policy” in Comment (c), which perhaps can account 
for the rareness with which it is used and recognized. Id. § 73(2), cmt. c. See also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 233.  Kay, supra note 18, at 52. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
234.  Reed, 476 U.S. at 854.  
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3. STATUTES OF REPOSE 
Another approach to dealing with the remedial retroactive 
application of Trimble concerns statutes of repose. On July 1, 1981, 
Mississippi amended its statute governing inheritance by non-marital 
children to conform to the Trimble holding.235 The amendment gave 
non-marital children who claimed to be entitled to inherit from or 
through the child’s birth father (and a birth father claiming to inherit 
from or through his non-marital child), where the decedent died before 
July 1, 1981, three years from that date to bring the claim. 236  In 
essence, it served as a statute of repose that gives those whose interests 
are affected by a change in the law a limited amount of time to bring 
claims related to events that occurred before the change was 
announced. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the statute in In re Estate of 
Kimble,237 holding that the statute affords non-marital children equal 
protection of the laws “while at the same time accomplish the legitimate 
state interest of (1) avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims, 
(2) the fair and just disposal of an intestate decedent’s property; and (3) 
the repose of titles to real property.” 238  In subsequent cases, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed dismissals of suits brought within 
the three-year period of the statute by persons claiming to be the non-
marital children of decedents who had died in 1958,239 1969,240  and 
1977.241 It is important to note that this legislation gave three years to 
bring claims—the length of time allocated before rights are terminated 
and proper notice requirements could be outcome determinative in 
whether statutes of repose are constitutional. 
4. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
The concerns of the Court in Mitchell, similarly to the concerns of 
the Court in Trimble and Reed, recognized that some illegitimate 
children of fathers who died intestate (here, analogous to the previously 
unrecognized spouses of same-sex couples) were entitled to inheritance 
rights when (1) the orderly settlement of estates, and (2) the 
dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws were not 
jeopardized. If these two standards were not met, then the state might 
 
235.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (West 2016). 
236.  Id.  
237.  447 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1984). 
 238.  Id. at 1283. 
 239.  Berry v. Berry, 463 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1984). 
 240.  Holloway v. Jones, 492 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1986). 
 241.  In re Estate of Smiley, 530 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 1988). 
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have had a valid interest in not re-visiting estate distribution on the 
grounds that the accurate, effective, and just distribution of estates 
would be compromised. 
In Collier v. Shell Oil Co.,242 the Mississippi Supreme Court held 
that the rights of non-marital children in the estate of their fathers, who 
had died intestate in 1955, could not prevail over the rights of bona fide 
purchasers of mineral rights in land included in the intestate estate, 
acquired before the date of the decision in Trimble. 243  This is a 
completely defensible result and certainly seems to comport with the 
limits on retroactivity set out less than a decade later in Justice Breyer’s 
Reynoldsville Casket Co. opinion: the bona fide purchaser principle is 
one of those principles which, in this particular context, can provide 
finality and which may also be appropriately described as “a well-
established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which 
general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy 
justifications . . . .”244 
Kau Agribusiness Co. v. Ahulau, was a case that examined the 
retroactive implications of an unconstitutional ban on non-marital 
children inheriting from the estates of their fathers pre-Trimble, against 
the rights of innocent bona fide purchasers.245 The case involved a quiet 
title action brought by the successor in interest to the original 
purchasers of land that was part of a decedent’s estate who died 
intestate in 1939.246  The defendants in the quiet title action claimed 
through their father, the decedent’s nephew.247  The defendants were 
descendants of the non-marital children of the nephew.248 The Hawaii 
Supreme Court discussed the issues involved at length. The court 
applied Trimble retroactively on the grounds that the affected parties 
would thus be able to receive proper compensation; however, the estate 
of the plaintiff’s father was not yet closed.249 The court decided that the 
heirs of the non-marital child cannot succeed in the quiet title action 
filed by the current property because the plaintiff is an “innocent 
purchaser” and the proof of paternity of the ancestor through whom the 
defendants claimed was “inconclusive.” 250  The court defined an 
innocent purchaser as one who “by an honest contract or agreement, 
purchases property or acquires an interest therein, without knowledge, 
 
 242.  534 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1988). 
243.  Id. at 1019. 
 244.  Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995) (emphasis 
original). 
245.  95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004). 
246.   Id. at 615. 
247.   Id. 
248.   Id. 
 249.  Id. 
250.  Id. at 625. 
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or means of knowledge sufficient to charge him in law with knowledge, 
of any infirmity in the title of the seller.”251 The Hawaii Supreme Court 
stated that because the estate of the uncle of the claimant’s father was 
never probated, his estate is still “subject to further resolution”—that is, 
it is still “open”—although he died in 1939.252  
The Hawaii Supreme Court also discussed at length Mitchell v. 
Hardwick,253 the South Carolina Supreme Court decision giving Trimble 
“limited retroactive application” where an innocent purchaser is not 
adversely affected by enforcing the new rule in the face of the 
purchaser’s reliance on the law existing at the time of the purchase, 
where paternity is “conclusively established,” and where the estate 
administration is subject to “further resolution.” 254  The Hawaii 
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the Mitchell criteria.255 
While Trimble and its lineage highlight remedial limitations of 
retroactivity to unique aspects of property and property succession 
laws, these cases predate Harper, a time when the retroactivity 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court was less clear and less robust. It 
should be noted, though, that the principle reason cited for limiting the 
retrospective reach of Trimble was “to prevent chaotic conditions” 
arising regarding real property titles256—an argument that many feel real 
property bar members and title insurers are currently making in light of 
Obergefell. Therefore, although a more robust concept has developed in 
recent years, Trimble provides examples of problematic remedial issues 
that are sure to arise in post-Obergefell disputes, especially when 
property has been sold or transferred to bona fide purchasers. 
E. U.S. v. Windsor and Retroactive Federal Rights for Some Same-Sex 
Marriages 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA raised 
the issue of whether same-sex spouses were deemed “married” under 
federal law beginning on the date of the Windsor decision 257  or 
retroactively to the dates of their actual marriages. For same-sex 
 
 251.  Id. (quoting Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 985 P.2d 1045, 1056 (Haw. 
1999)). 
 252.  Id. at 626. 
253.  374 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. 1988).  
 254.  Id. at 681–83. 
255.  Kau Agribusiness, 95 P.3d at 626.  
 256.  See, e.g., Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ark. 1979) The dissent 
in Frakes is an excellent exposition of the state of the law at the time and clearly shows 
the development of the trend that would culminate in Harper. Id. 
 257.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2014) (holding that “DOMA is unconstitutional as 
a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution”). 
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spouses, Windsor significantly changed the landscape of federal tax 
law, federal employee benefits law (including spousal protections under 
ERISA), and their respective related regulations. More important for 
this discussion, though, is that Windsor invoked retroactivity issues 
concerning same-sex marriage in cases where one of the spouses had a 
life event (such as a retirement, death, or divorce) prior to the Windsor 
decision. Not surprisingly, courts applied the retroactivity doctrine as 
espoused in Harper to post-Windsor disputes. Therefore, the recent 
application of Windsor provides an analogous example of examining the 
retroactivity of same-sex marriages post-Obergefell. 
Post-Windsor, the IRS and Treasury Department were the first 
to issue an applicable statement regarding the retroactivity of same-sex 
marriage.258 The IRS and the Treasury jointly issued Revenue Ruling 
2013-17 (along with two sets of Frequently Asked Questions), which 
fleshed out some of the outstanding issues concerning same-sex 
marriages from a federal tax law perspective (FAQs 10–15 cover health 
benefits and 16–19 cover qualified plans).259 First, the IRS held that 
gender-specific terminology (e.g. “husband,” “wife,” etc.) in the 
Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in a gender neutral 
manner in light of Windsor.260 While significant, this can be thought of 
as a holding of convenience, forestalling the necessity of sweeping 
 
 258.  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. From a federal perspective, 
retroactivity would affect, in part, filing joint income tax returns; claiming the marital 
deduction for estate and gift tax purposes under Sections 2523 and 2056 of the Code; 
gift splitting under Section 2513 of the Code; electing portability under Section 
2010(c)(4) of the Code; same-sex spouse being automatically assigned to the same 
generation of his or her spouse for GST purposes under Section 2651(c) of the Code; 
using the reverse QTIP election; taking advantage of step-up in income tax basis under 
Section 1014(b)(6) of the Code on both halves of the community property at the first 
spouse’s death, including jointly owned property in the estate under Section 2040(b) of 
the Code; applying grantor trust rules that are triggered by a spouse’s benefits or 
control over a trust; not recognizing gains and losses on sales between spouses; 
disclaiming certain interests in property while retaining other rights in the disclaimed 
property under Section 2518 of the Code; naming the spouse as the beneficiary under a 
qualified retirement account and allowing the spouse to roll over the benefits of a 
deceased spouse’s IRA into the surviving spouses own IRA or into an inherited IRA 
which provides distributions over the surviving spouse' life expectancy; eliminating 
adverse tax consequences for the transfer of property pursuant to a marriage settlement 
agreement and taking advantage of non-inclusion in taxable income of the employer-
paid health insurance premiums for coverage of the employee’s same-sex spouse; and 
recognized for purposes of employee benefit plans governed by ERISA. 
 259.  The Treasury Department recently issued final regulations that reflect the 
holdings of Windsor, Obergefell, and Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The regulations define 
terms in the Code describing the marital status of taxpayers for federal tax purposes. As 
in the earlier proposed regulations (NPRM REG-148998-13), the final regulations 
provide that the terms “spouse,” “husband,” and “wife” mean an individual lawfully 
married to another individual, and the term “husband and wife” means two individuals 
lawfully married to each other. T.D. 9785, 2016-38 C.B. 38, at 361. 
 260   Id. 
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changes to the Code to correct for gender-specific terminology. Second, 
(and the most publicized portion) the IRS issued a ruling that, for 
federal tax purposes, a couple would be considered married (or not) 
based on the state of celebration—not the state of residence.261 Finally, 
the IRS ruled that civil unions and domestic partnerships—even those 
with rights concomitant to marriage—would not be considered 
marriages for purposes of federal tax law. 262  Because the Supreme 
Court held that DOMA section 3 was unconstitutional, the statute was 
void ab initio and, accordingly, Revenue Ruling 2014-19 mandated that 
the Windsor decision be applied retroactively for the purpose of filing 
original, amended, and adjusted tax returns, or claims for certain 
credits or refunds. 263  While the IRS and the Treasury Department 
applied Windsor retroactively for federal tax purposes, the retroactive 
application was limited to open tax years—basically same-sex spouses 
could (but were not required to) go back three years and file amended 
returns.264 
On April 4, 2014, the IRS issued Notice 2014-19,265 explaining the 
application of the Windsor decision and Revenue Ruling 2014-19 to 
qualified retirement plans. The Notice states that any retirement plan 
qualification rule that applies because a participant is married must be 
applied equally to same-sex spouses.266 Qualified plans must reflect “the 
outcome of Windsor as of June 26, 2013” or risk losing tax 
qualification.267 Through September 16, 2013, though, a plan would not 
lose its tax qualification for recognizing only same-sex participants 
domiciled in states that recognized same-sex marriages.268 After that 
date, all plans must recognized same-sex marriages regardless of 
whether the spouse’s state of domicile recognized same-sex 
marriages.269 The Notice also provided that if a plan does not define 
“spouse” or “marriage” in a manner inconsistent with Windsor, an 
amendment is not required but the plan must be operated in accordance 
with the Notice.270 It should be noted that the Notice did not provide 
relief from any claim that a same-sex spouse might bring asserting 
 
 261.   Id. 
 262.   Id. 
 263.   Id.  
 264.  Id. If protective elections had been made, of course, the time period 
might be longer. 
 265.  Notice 2014-19, 2014-47 I.R.B. 979. 
266.   Id. 
267.   Id. 
268.   Id. 
269.   Id. 
270.   Id. 
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rights to spousal benefits based on events that happened before June 
2013.271 
Although Notice 2014-19 did not address specific retroactive 
relief, a few courts raised retroactivity issues concerning employee 
benefits and required that benefits be provided on pre-Windsor events. 
In Cozen O’ Conner, P.C. v. Tobits,272  a district court applied 
Windsor retroactively to allow the plaintiff to recover death benefits.273 
Ms. Tobits and Ms. Farley were married in Canada in 2006.274 Farley 
participated in her employer’s pension plan.275 She died in 2010 (pre-
Windsor) and her employer refused to grant Tobits any survivor 
benefits because the employer did not recognize Tobits as a surviving 
spouse.276 The court determined that because the employee benefit plan 
was an ERISA-qualified plan,277 and that the plan did not specifically 
exclude same-sex spouses, then the language of the plan should be 
construed in accordance with federal law. 278  The court held that, 
according to Windsor, “spouse” encompassed same-sex couples for 
federal purposes, and the court provided Todbits retroactive relief.279 
Therefore, if a participant or beneficiary has a claim for benefits under 
the terms of a plan, and the plan can be read to provide spousal benefits 
to same-sex spouses, that claim can still be brought even if it is based 
on events prior to Windsor.280 
In the health plan context, a Ninth Circuit panel awarded back pay 
for the costs of health insurance to a former federal employee in 
Oregon who had not been permitted to enroll her same-sex partner in 
the federal employee’s health plan prior to Windsor.281  It should be 
noted, though, that the panel did not directly address retroactivity.282 
 
271.  See id. 
272.  No. 11–0045, 2013 WL 3878688 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013).  
 273.  Id. at *4. 
274.   Id. at *1. 
275.   Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. at *3. The Internal Revenue Service Code and ERISA require benefit 
plans to meet certain requirements to be qualified for tax preferences. Id. Because the 
ERISA-eligible plan in Tobits was drafted in compliance with federal law and expressly 
required the plan to be construed in compliance with federal law, Windsor provided the 
federal interpretation of the term “spouse.” Id. 
 278.  Id. at *4. 
 279.  Id. at *4–5. 
 280.  Simply, although a plan did not have to recognize same-sex marriages 
prior to the dates announced in Notice 2014-19, participants and beneficiaries may still 
bring claims for spousal benefits and claims for violations of ERISA or the terms of a 
plan, even if the claims are based on events prior to Windsor.  
 281.  In re Fonberg, 736 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 282.  Id. A different case raising retroactivity issues involving the denial of 
federal health benefits to same-sex spouses was filed, but settled in September 2015. 
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A recent decision from California applied Windsor to an ERISA 
plan based on events that predate Windsor. In Schuett v. FedEx 
Corp.,283 a surviving same-sex spouse, whose partner died before the 
Windsor decision, brought a claim against FedEx for survivor 
benefits.284 FedEx filed a motion to dismiss and stated that at the time 
of the spouse’s death FedEx’s ERISA plan explicitly defined “spouse” 
to include only opposite-sex couples. 285  They argued that Windsor 
should not be applied retroactively because there were special 
circumstances that justified a departure from the retroactivity standard 
announced in Harper.286 The court denied the motion to dismiss and 
stated that it was “not persuaded at this stage of the case and under the 
facts alleged in the complaint that there is any basis for denying 
retroactive application of Windsor.”287 
In addition, “the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
granted an administrative claim for retroactive survivor benefits 
brought by a surviving same-sex spouse of a federal employee who died 
in 2011.” 288  The couple was married in 2008. 289  When the federal 
employee died in 2011, the surviving spouse was denied benefits by 
OPM based on DOMA.290 The surviving spouse filed a timely claim for 
survivor benefits in 2014, arguing that OPM should not apply the 
unconstitutional law in evaluating her claim, but rather should apply 
Windsor retroactively. 291  OPM granted the claim, and the surviving 
spouse received death benefits and a monthly annuity retroactive to the 
death of the federal employee. 292  In June 2014, the United States 
Attorney General issued a memo stating that “OPM has begun the 
process of working with surviving spouses of federal employees and 
annuitants who died prior to the Windsor decision to ensure that these 
widows and widowers receive the benefits to which they would have 
 
See Complaint, Hudson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 15-cv-01539 (N.D. Cal. filed 
Apr. 3, 2015). 
283.  119 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 284.  Id. at 1157–58. 
 285.  Id. at 1157. 
 286.  Id. at 1163. 
 287.  Id. at 1166. 
288.  Teresa S. Renaker et al., Post-DOMA Employee Benefits Issues Affecting 
Employees in Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic  
Partnership, AMERICANBAR.ORG (Oct. 14, 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2014/9a_post-
doma.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW2C-RDBK]. 
289.  Id. 
290.  Id. 
291.  Id.  
292.  Id.  
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otherwise been entitled had DOMA not prohibited OPM from 
recognizing their marriages.”293 
The retroactive application of Windsor to same-sex marriages will 
provide much needed guidance in analyzing the effects of Obergefell. It 
should be kept in mind, though, that the Obergefell opinion announced 
an extension of federal constitutional rights, which may be somewhat 
different from the retroactive application of a decision invalidating a 
statute such as that at issue in Windsor. Regardless, this would tend to 
make an argument for a retroactive application even stronger following 
Obergefell. 
F. Precedents on Remedial Relief Concerning Unconstitutional 
Discriminatory Acts 
In addition to the review of retroactivity jurisprudence in civil 
cases, a brief examination of remedial reliefs proffered by courts when 
statutes have been held unconstitutional based upon discriminatory acts 
provide insights to the issues raised in Obergefell. In the past, when the 
Supreme Court has invalidated laws that discriminate against discrete 
groups, such as African Americans and women, the Court has held 
remedial relief must be crafted in order to restore the victims of 
unconstitutional discrimination to the position that they would have 
occupied but for the discrimination.294 Accordingly, these precedents 
are important to any discussion concerning remedies in post-Obergefell 
disputes. 
For instance, in United States v. Virginia,295 the Supreme Court 
applied this type of remedial relief to a class of persons that are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, that being women.296 In fact, this application 
was explicitly pointed out by Justice Scalia in his dissent.297 In United 
 
 293.  Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to The President of 
The United States, Implementation of United States v. Windsor (June 20, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9722014620103930904785.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PE7T-LX5S]. 
 294.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (the Court held 
that remedies “must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity 
or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied . . .’”) (quoting Milliken, 433 
U.S. at 280); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279–80 (1977) (noting that, in 
enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, courts were not limited to prospectively 
stopping the discriminatory actions, but could also fashion remedies to undue the effects 
of the prior discriminatory actions); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 
(1965) (“[T]he court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which 
will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like 
discrimination in the future.”).  
295.   518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
296.   Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
297.   Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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States v. Virginia, the Court struck down the Virginia Military 
Institute’s male-only admission policy.298 
In prophylactic response to the inequality, Virginia proposed a 
matching program exclusively for women called the Virginia Women’s 
institute for Leadership. 299  The Court did not find this proposal 
remedial enough, as it would not restore the victims of the 
discrimination, women, to a place they would have occupied but for the 
unconstitutional discrimination. 300  Specifically, the proposal did not 
provide women with the same type and standard of military training or 
advancements that Virginia Military Institute provided for its male 
counterparts.301 United States v. Virginia serves as a strong example of 
the Courts’ eagerness to specifically strike down unconstitutional laws 
and provide for restorative measures despite the facts of the case 
lacking a heightened or strict scrutiny foundation. In fact, that 
eagerness to strike absent a strict scrutiny basis is latently pointed out in 
the dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia.302 
After the opinion, the Virginia Military Institute contemplated 
bypassing the ruling by making the school private. 303  Had this 
hypothetical materialized, the Department of the Defense would have 
removed all ROTC programs.304 This threat from the Department of 
Defense caused Congress’ knee-jerk reaction to prevent the military, 
through legislative amendment, from removing any ROTC programs 
from a military college. 305  The political crossfire was for naught, 
however, as the Virginia Military Institute’s Board voted to admit 
women to the school.306 
Although the application of this type of remedial relief traditionally 
applies to classes that receive heightened scrutiny, the application of 
remedial relief may apply even to classes that do not traditionally 
receive heightened scrutiny. 307  Furthermore, courts have become 
increasingly more likely to apply a heightened scrutiny to same-sex 
couples and grant them broad remedial relief.308 As the Court stated in 
its opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, “class-based legislation directed at 
 
298.   Id. at 519. 
299.   Id. at 526. 
300.   Id. at 547. 
301.   Id. at 548–49. 
302.   Id. at 570–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
303.   Katharine T. Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of United 
States v. Virginia 32–34 (Duke Law Working Papers, Paper No. 12, 2010), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/12/ [https://perma.cc/NKC6-EH3F]. 
304.   Id. at 34. 
305.   See 10 U.S.C. § 2111a(3)(d) (2012). 
306.   Bartlett, supra note 303, at 33. 
 307.  Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889–90 (Iowa 2009). 
308.   See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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homosexuals [is] a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”309 Indeed, 
the Lawrence Court noted that the Texas statute in question directly 
targeted homosexual individuals and had the effect of making 
homosexuality a crime.310 The Court used the exclusivity of the law to 
homosexual individuals to distinguish it from Bowers v. Hardwick,311 
where the law in question applied equally to all groups and therefore 
avoided Equal Protection analysis. 312  Therefore, the Court asked a 
different question than was asked in Bowers: “whether, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to 
justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not 
heterosexual sodomy. It is not.” 313  Thus, the Court concluded that, 
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the 
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause.” 314  In addition, in Varnum v. 
Brien,315 the Supreme Court of Iowa held that sexual orientation was a 
quasi-suspect class and applied heightened scrutiny in analyzing it.316 
The court found that the Iowa civil marriage statute failed to provide 
equal protection of the law and granted the plaintiffs the remedy they 
requested.317 In Griego v. Oliver,318 the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a same-sex couple because the 
legislation at issue “affect[ed] a sensitive class” rather than a suspect 
class. 319  In Love v. Beshear, 320  a Kentucky district court found that 
“homosexual persons constitute a quasi-suspect class,” and applied 
heightened scrutiny.321 
While the aforementioned cases are distinct in that they do not 
apply retroactive relief, they do serve as guiding precedents and display 
courts’ growing propensity to apply heightened scrutiny and afford 
broad relief to same-sex couples. In the wake of Obergefell, we can 
expect courts to place a much higher value on affording broad relief to 
same sex couples, and that broad relief is likely to include the remedial 
relief commonly afforded to discrete classes. 
 
 309.  Id. at 574.  
 310.  Id. at 582. 
311.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 312.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582. 
 313.  Id.  
 314.  Id. at 582–83. 
315.   763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 316.  Id. at 889–90. 
 317.  Id.  
318.   316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013). 
 319.  Id. at 879.  
320.   989 F. Supp. 2d 539 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 321.  Id. at 547. 
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III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF OBERGEFELL322 
By building upon the prior discussion concerning the applicable 
jurisprudence of the doctrine of retroactivity in regards to 
unconstitutional civil statutes, this Article introduces a normative 
analysis of the retroactive application of Obergefell to pertinent state 
law issues concerning real property and property succession laws.323 
Although the Supreme Court provides no guidance concerning the 
retroactive nature (or limitations) of its decision in Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court’s current retroactivity jurisprudence and the analogous 
precedents discussed above will provide a predictive analysis of how 
Obergefell will be applied retroactively. 
A. Obergefell’s Retroactive Application as a Choice-of-Law Rule 
Returning to the Article’s opening question of when do previously 
unrecognized, but otherwise lawful, same-sex marriages begin: they 
 
 322.  Although I originally spoke on these issues in January 2014 during a 
speech at Heckerling, many ideas and thoughts in this section of the Article evolved 
over many discussions, emails, and presentations with Assoc, Dean William P. 
LaPiana. See generally Tritt, Because it Wasn’t Complicated Enough, supra note 1. 
Over the past few years, Dean LaPiana and I together have made numerous 
presentations concerning real-world issues arising from Windsor and Obergefell. 
Dean LaPiana has also written on some of these issues and some of these issues are 
reflected in this section. For further reading, see William P. LaPiana, Married Same-
Sex Couples Living in Non-Recognition States: A Primer, 7 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY 
PROP. L.J. 417–73 (Summer 2015). 
 323.  From a federal perspective, Windsor already leveled the playing field for 
same-sex spouses. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). Therefore 
this Article will focus on states’ real property and property succession issues. It should 
be noted, though, that Obergefell has helped simplify plan administration by providing 
nationally uniform marriage access and recognition. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2608 (2015). In addition, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has evolved 
their position on retroactivity in the wake of Obergefell. On August 20, 2015, the 
Department of Justice announced that, for purposes of Social Security Benefits, the 
SSA would recognize the marriage of surviving spouses of valid same-sex marriages. 
Jonathan Adams, SSA Tells Court it Will Apply Obergefell Retroactively to Grant 
Spousal Benefits in Lambda Legal Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_20150820_ssa-apply-obergefell-retroactively-
spousal-benefits [https://perma.cc/7R9Q-A7PN]. The SSA stipulated that it would only 
recognize the marriages retroactively if the claim was already pending, and if the same-
sex couple resided in a state where their marriage was not recognized at the time of the 
deceased spouse’s death. Id. This decision, which to date has not been reflected in the 
SSA’s official publications, applies the Obergefell holding retroactively in the sense that 
claims will now be accepted so long as they were pending on the date of the Obergefell 
decision. Moreover, since the Windsor decision, the SSA has encouraged surviving 
spouses of same-sex marriages to apply for benefits “right away.”  
Important Information for Same-Sex Couples, SOCIALSECURITY.GOV, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/people/same-sexcouples/ [https://perma.cc/W4TH-
QRXA] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).  
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definitely began on the date of their marriage, not on the date of the 
Obergefell decision. It is clear that the Court’s judicial pronouncements 
are retroactive in nature “to all events, regardless of whether such 
events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule,”324 especially 
concerning disputes involving fundamental rights. Moreover, fairness 
focused on reliance interests should not supersede fairness focused on 
interests of equal treatment of fundamental rights. As Justice Thomas 
wrote in Harper, “the federal law applicable to a particular case does 
not turn on ‘whether [litigants] actually relied on [an] old rule [or] how 
they would suffer from retroactive application’ of a new one.” 325 
Therefore, substantive law should not shift according to claims of 
reliance on an old rule that deprived people of a fundamental right. 
Obergefell, then, should be applied purely retroactively in the sense that 
it applies to all cases still pending on direct review, and also to conduct 
occurring prior to the date of the Obergefell decision. This follows the 
application of the retroactivity doctrine as expressed, developed, and 
applied in Harper and later related cases. 
In addition, although many of these post-Obergefell disputes will 
involve state law issues, it is clear that federal retroactivity 
jurisprudence is applicable to these disputes. In general, state law 
governs property and property succession laws. Therefore, many of the 
post-Obergefell disputes may be litigated in state courts—and the high 
courts of various states may have developed their own retroactivity 
jurisprudence applicable to their decisions. The Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, however, dictates that state courts 
should apply the property implications of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Obergefell retroactively. 326  Simply, the effect of Obergefell is a 
matter of federal constitutional law, and any particular views held by 
state courts regarding the retroactive application of state decisions 
becomes irrelevant. Although state courts have begun litigating many of 
the retroactive issues concerning property in the wake Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the retroactivity of its decision is 
germane and appropriate for our exploration. 
It is clear that Obergefell should be applied retroactively for 
choice-of-law considerations. The retroactive effect of Obergefell may 
be limited, however, in the sense that independent principles of law 
may restrict the relief that a court may provide. Therefore, an analysis 
of Obergefell’s application for remedial considerations is in order. 
 
 324.  Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 
325.   Id. at 95 n.9 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 
529, 543 (1991)). 
 326.  Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995) (noting 
that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution requires states to apply such rules 
retroactively); see also Harper, 509 U.S. at 100; Kay, supra note 18, at 50.  
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B. Obergefell’s Retroactive Applications as a Remedial Principle 
Obergefell should be applied retroactively for remedial 
considerations as well. The retroactive application of judicial decisions 
concerning remedial matters, however, is complicated. First, the Court 
acknowledged in Reynoldsville Casket Co. that there could be multiple 
ways in which to fashion remedies while satisfying the constitutional 
requirements of equal protection.327 Second, the Court has recognized 
potential limitations concerning the retroactive application of remedial 
matters, and that the Chevron Oil factors could apply in determining the 
limitations of remedial principles limitations (not choice-of-law 
matters). 328  The Court has also expressed concerns that retroactive 
application of remedial principles might implicate notions of fairness 
concerning the finality of litigation and harm arising from transfers of 
property to innocent bona fide purchasers.329 Adequate remedies may be 
fashioned, though, that protect both the victims of the now 
unconstitutional discriminatory acts and the innocent third parties. 
First, issues may arise if the estate’s property was distributed prior 
to Obergefell. This should not pose a substantial problem, however, 
because probate courts in certain states can “claw back” and 
redistribute the property to the rightful heirs. This isn’t a novel 
concept. Probate courts have a history of “clawing-back” improper 
distributions. 330  Further, the Uniform Probate Code authorizes the 
redistribution of improperly distributed property. Uniform Probate 
Code section 3-909 states that an individual who receives improperly 
distributed property “is liable to return the property improperly 
received . . . .”331 Even if the distribution was authorized at the time it 
was made, the distribution may still be considered improper under 
states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code.332 Jurisdictions that 
have not adopted the Uniform Probate Code may have different rules 
governing the recovery of improperly distributed property. 333  For 
 
327.   514 U.S. at 758–59. 
328.   Id. at 758–59. 
329.  Id. at 757–58. 
 330.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Zaritsky, 12 P.3d 1203, 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that the probate court had the authority to order the creditor to 
relinquish improperly distributed property to the estate); Keul v. Hodges Blvd. 
Presbyterian Church, 180 So. 3d 1074, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that 
the trial court had the authority to order the testator’s former caregiver to return funds 
obtained through undue influence); In re Estate of Vernon, 637 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that improperly distributed property may be returned to 
the state as long as the limitations period has not expired). 
 331.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-909 (amended 2010). 
 332.  Id. at cmt. 
 333.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 733.812 (2016) (“A distributee or a claimant who 
was paid improperly must return the assets or funds received, and the income from 
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example, Washington, D.C. allows for the recovery and redistribution 
of improperly distributed property within one year of the initial 
distribution, while Arizona and Wisconsin permit recovery of 
improperly distributed property within three years after the decedent’s 
death or one year after the time the property was distributed. 334 
Regardless of the jurisdictional nuances, the ability to “claw back” and 
redistribute improperly distributed property is a tool available to many 
probate courts. 
Second, should the administrative convenience of finality trump 
the concerns of those denied a fundamental right? The Supreme Court 
has expressed concern over the seemingly unlimited retroactive liability 
for actions taken in reliance on laws that were subsequently deemed to 
be unconstitutional. 335  To this effect, the Court has been careful to 
explain the need for finality in certain circumstances, and has 
recognized possible limitations regarding remedial considerations in 
cases involving res judicata, statutes of limitation, and laws requiring 
parties aggrieved by law to provide timely notice of their objection.336 
The desire for finality, though, must be balanced against harm 
caused by the deprivation of fundamental rights under unconstitutional 
discriminatory statutes. As discussed earlier, where the Supreme Court 
has invalidated laws that discriminate against discrete groups of 
 
those assets or interest on the funds since distribution or payment, unless the 
distribution or payment cannot be questioned because of adjudication, estoppel, or 
limitations. If the distributee or claimant does not have the property, its value at the 
date of disposition, income thereon, and gain received by the distributee or claimant 
must be returned.”); see also In re Estate of Vernon, 608 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1992) (“Defendants in estate administrator's suit seeking to establish that 
stock in defendant's name was in reality decedent's were not ‘distributees’ of property 
of estate under probate code section addressing improper distribution and liability of 
distributees, so as to subject them to less restrictive method of service of process 
provided in code; to use section in question would assume very fact sought to be 
litigated as jurisdictional base for probate court.”); Keul, 180 So. 3d at 1074 (Trial 
court had authority to order testator's former caregiver to return funds former caregiver 
had obtained through her payable-on-death designation on testator's credit union 
accounts, which designation had been obtained through undue influence and was 
invalid, to testator's estate); In re Estate of Vernon, 637 So. 2d at 366 (If, as alleged, 
check for additional stock was written on date of decedent's death and check was 
negotiated and stock was received after decedent's death by secured creditor which held 
previous shares of the same stock as collateral for a loan, stock would be estate asset, 
subject to suit by administrator for return of improper distribution. “Statute of 
limitations on action by administrator to recover alleged improper distribution did not 
begin to run until discovery of deficiency of assets to pay debts, even though suit 
concerned payment to a creditor rather than a beneficiary”). 
 334.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1303 (2016) (effective Mar. 24, 1998); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3936 (2016) (effective Jan. 1, 1974); WIS. STAT. § 865.14 
(2013–14). 
335.  Reynolds Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 749 (1995).  
 336.  Id. at 756. 
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victims, the Court has fashioned relief to make the victims whole.337 As 
has been noted, “the court has not merely the power but the duty to 
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the 
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in 
the future.”338  Therefore, remedial measures should be applied in a 
manner that places formally unrecognized same-sex spouses in the same 
position that they would have been but for the unconstitutional 
discriminatory act. 
In addition, a state’s interest in finality may be less applicable in 
post-Obergefell disputes. The earliest possible same-sex marriage dates 
back merely to 2004.339 Because of this extremely limited time period, 
the number of affected people is too small to cause an undue 
administrative burden for states. 
Also, statutes of limitation may not have been implicated because 
many property transfers in post-Obergefell disputes will have passed by 
matter of law (such as community property or homestead), and will 
have been outside the realm of probate or the laws of decent and 
distribution. 340  Therefore, many of the parties would not have been 
given proper notice and statutes of limitation would not have run 
because the property would not have been transferred by judicial 
decisions or actions that would begin the tolling of statutes of 
limitation. 
Third, should remedial applications of Obergefell impede a third 
party bona fide purchaser’s reliance on then law? There are serious 
concerns involving notions of fairness concerning transfers of property 
to innocent bona fide purchasers. 
Therefore, a more critical analysis of remedial considerations 
needs to be taken in these areas. Accordingly, this Article will now 
proceed to examine retroactive remedies in the context of two areas of 
state law: real property and property succession law. Both of these 
state-law-governed areas require an examination of estate 
administration, homestead, community property, and tenancy-by-the-
entirety rights to determine equitable remedies for affected parties.341 
 
337.   See supra, Part II.F. 
 338.  Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).  
339.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 340.  E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201A–3-101A (amended 2010). 
 341.  Although parentage issues are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth 
mentioning that parentage issues are heavily implicated in the context of Obergefell’s 
retroactivity. For example, assume that a woman married to another woman conceives 
through artificial insemination using anonymously donated sperm and gives birth. The 
couple resides in a state that does not recognize their marriage. If second parent 
adoption is available in the state, one would hope that the other spouse has adopted the 
child, although that is likely not an option. If they are in a jurisdiction where the child 
is considered a child of both spouses due to the existence of the marriage, has the child 
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1. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION342 
One lesson to be drawn from the aftermath of Trimble is that the 
status of a surviving same-sex spouse as heir of a decedent who died 
before Obergefell is greatly dependent upon whether the decedent’s 
estate was still “open” on the date of the Obergefell decision. The 
Court’s decision in Reed seems to provide some precedent regarding 
the resolution of at least some of the issues that would be raised by 
retroactively applying Obergefell to the estates of decedents who lived 
in non-recognition states at the time of their deaths. 343  Surviving 
spouses of decedents who died before June 26, 2015 should be able to 
claim the status of heir to the decedent’s estate if the decedent’s estate 
is still “open.” 
In our prior example from the introduction, it is easy to determine 
which survivors should claim the status of heirs to Thelma’s estate. The 
estate is still open, therefore, Louise and J.D. are Thelma’s lawful 
heirs. The mother has no standing because she is not an heir. 
Unfortunately, the term “open” estate isn’t as definitive as it 
sounds. In fact, most estates are probably never formally closed in the 
sense that the personal representative has accounted to the court, 
process has been issued to those interested, and the court has issued a 
decree approving the accounts and discharging the personal 
 
been the child of both spouses from birth or only from the date of judicial decision that 
invalidated the state’s ban on same-sex marriage? In this case, retroactive application of 
Obergefell is not difficult. The child will benefit from having two parents from birth 
and the case may very well be decided by the classic “best interests of the child” 
standard. However, what if the couple has separated before the date of Obergefell, or 
even divorced, and the spouse who did not give birth was held not to be a parent? Does 
that result now change? Answers will come through legislation, or more likely, 
litigation. In the wake of Obergefell, courts need to recognize the marital presumption 
(in states where it exists) in the context of same-sex marriage. A retroactive recognition 
of the marital presumption should be implicit in the constitutional rights recognized and 
codified by Obergefell and should take precedent over any estate issues that might arise. 
 342.  The purpose of the law of succession is that, in a private property system, 
there must be a procedure to facilitate the transfer of an individual’s private property. 
American society has long recognized the value in protecting an individual’s ability to 
acquire and transfer property. The principle of donative freedom, the governing 
principle underlying American succession law, provides that individuals have the 
freedom to control the disposition of their property at death. Effectuating donative 
intent is the hallmark of property succession law. Any succession law disputes that arise 
from Obergefell should be viewed through this lens. For a discussion concerning the 
importance of the principle, see Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated 
Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 
367, 374–79 (2009). See also Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of 
America’s Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 752–54 (2014); Lee-ford 
Tritt, The Limitations of An Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2579, 2587–88, 2598–2601 (2011). 
343.  Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986). 
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representative from further liability. An estate may be considered 
“closed” when the final assets of the estate are distributed, which 
normally means that the Executor has no further work to perform.344 
An estate may be considered “open” as long as the applicable statutes 
of repose have not run, or if there is no final resolution of the issues 
involved in the distribution of the decedent’s estate. Further 
complications arise because proper notice may not have been given to 
same-sex spouses during probate in violation of due process 
jurisprudence. 
However, even if Thelma’s estate had been “closed,” that would 
not be the end of the road for Louise and J.D. Estates can be re-opened 
under special circumstances. Though these special circumstances vary 
by state, there are some commonalities throughout the country, such as 
fraud, procedural irregularities, bad faith, manifest error, and equity.345 
Of course, whether or not an estate is subject to further 
administration clearly affects the “orderly and just distribution of a 
decedent’s property at death.” 346  Although courts traditionally give 
weight to the argument that a state needs to be able to efficiently 
distribute and close a decedent’s estate, this is not necessarily 
conclusive in and of itself. As noted in Trimble, “inheritance rights can 
be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or 
the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.”347 
In Trimble and its lineage, the issue was whether or not the question of 
paternity could be accurately satisfied (necessary to determine whether 
the Contestant was in fact entitled to a share of the estate). In the 
population of same-sex marriages, the question of marriage is much 
 
 344.  In California, the closing of an estate will be considered once all debts 
have been paid or adequately provided for and the personal representative has filed an 
account and petition for the final distribution of the estate with the relevant probate 
court. CAL. CIV. PRAC. PROBATE & TR. PROCEEDINGS § 21:41 (2016). Final distribution 
and closing of an estate in California is governed by the California Probate Code. See 
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 12200–12202 (West 2015-16). In Florida, an estate may be closed 
once the personal representative has completed the administration and distribution of an 
estate. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 733.801–.901(1) (2016). The soonest an estate may be 
closed in Massachusetts is six months. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 3-1003(a) 
(2016). A personal representative must ensure that (1) the time in which creditors may 
bring a claim against decedent’s estate has expired; (2) the estate has been fully 
administered and the assets distributed; and (3) a copy of the personal representative’s 
statement to close the estate has been sent to all distributes or creditors of the estate. Id. 
 345.  Florida case law only permits the reopening of an estate after the 
discharge of the personal representative where there were procedural irregularities or 
facts constituting fraud or bad faith. See Liechty v. Hall, 687 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997). Similarly, if an estate in Massachusetts was closed and involved “fraud or 
manifest error,” then the estate will be reopened. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, 
§ 3-1003(b) (2016). 
 346.  Reed, 476 U.S. at 855. 
 347.  Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1997).  
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more conclusive, and easily resolved, than the requirement of proof of 
paternity. “After an estate has finally been distributed, the interest in 
finality may provide an additional, valid justification for barring belated 
assertion of claims” from newly recognized beneficiaries. 348  Thus, 
justice for a same-sex spouse that was denied marital property rights 
must be weighed against the state’s interest in the finality of 
distributions of estate. 
Unlike in Trimble, though, the fact that Obergefell announced an 
extension of federal constitutional rights (not merely invalidating a state 
statute) could play heavily in weighing competing policy issues, 
including whether to reopen estates for those same-sex surviving 
spouses who were deprived of property rights, proper notice, and due 
process.349 The double injustice to these surviving spouses—first, being 
unconstitutionally unrecognized, and second, being denied their rights 
under property succession law—is an extremely unjust outcome. 
Though some states will argue reliance upon existing law or undue 
administrative burden, these arguments have become weaker at some 
temporal point over the last decade and a half. DOMA and the first 
Baby DOMAs350 began in 1996—not a very long period of reliance to 
overcome the unjust nature of the deprivation of property rights. 
Moreover, the first state to recognize same-marriage did so in 2004,351 
and as more states began to recognize same-sex marriage, the reliance 
argument becomes weaker. As for the undue burden argument, it 
should be noted that the pertinent time period is relatively short (from 
2004 until the Obergefell decision in 2015) and only a small number of 
lawfully married same-sex couples moved to non-recognition states 
during that time period. 352  Therefore, it is unlikely that the burden 
would be overwhelming. 
a. Testacy Estates 
If the estate is deemed “open,” the status of the surviving same-
sex spouse as heir must be recognized. There are two retroactive issues 
in regards to the testate estate of a deceased spouse of a same-sex 
marriage who might have died in a non-recognition state before 
Obergefell.353 First, the surviving spouse should be entitled to his or her 
elective share if in a separate property state or his or her community 
 
 348.  Reed, 476 U.S. at 855.  
349.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 350.  See supra note 39. 
351.   Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 352.  See American Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples, supra note 
78. 
353.  See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
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property share if in a community property state. 354  Second, if the 
decedent was not survived by any descendants, then the surviving 
spouse is most likely the sole heir. 355  Such a situation precludes 
collateral relatives from claiming rights in the estate and negates their 
standing to challenge the will. 
In our example, if Thelma had a duly executed will that left 
everything to Louise but Thelma’s mother challenged the will before 
the Obergefell decision, Thelma’s mother would have standing in a 
non-recognition state because the mother would be deemed the heir at 
law (J.D. might have standing, though, as the next lawful heir). If the 
will has not yet been admitted, and litigation or preparation for 
litigation has only begun, then Obergefell must be given retroactive 
effect. Louise will be recognized as the surviving spouse on the date of 
the decedent’s death even though it occurred before June 26, 2015, and 
the litigation must conclude because Thelma’s mother no longer has 
standing as heir. If the litigation had already been decided but the time 
for appeal has not run, Louise should prevail as well.356 But what if the 
will had already been admitted through a settlement of the parties prior 
to Obergefell? Can the settlement be undone if recognition means that 
Thelma’s mother now does not have standing? Assuming the court has 
approved the settlement, it may be impossible to undo. If the will was 
denied probate because the mother prevailed, it may be equally 
impossible to undue that decree, although a court in equity probably 
could rule on the loss of standing even after the action has been 
resolved. If the time for appeals had not lapsed, Louise may have a 
stronger argument. This result may not be easy to accept if the will was 
denied probate, mainly because the mother objecting to probate should 
not have had standing to do so. Unfortunately, if there are any remedies 
at all for the surviving same-sex spouse, they may be very limited if the 
litigation process was completed before Obergefell. 
 
354.  Id. 
355.  Id. 
 356.  If the challenge is coming from people who would be heirs even if the 
marriage were recognized, most likely descendants of the decedent, the case would 
continue, but with the surviving spouse in a much better position, not only as heir, but 
also entitled to community property or the elective share.  
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b. Intestacy Estates357 
The meaning of “open” is even murkier in intestate estates than in 
testate estates. For instance, in the Mississippi cases discussed above, 
the court seemed to imply that property (at least real property) passed 
automatically in intestacy without formal probate proceedings.358 The 
courts discussed the lack of “probate” in the estates of the long-ago 
deceased alleged paternal ancestors.359 The courts in Marshall and Kau 
Agribusiness contrasted “passive” reliance on the intestacy statute with 
reliance on a court proceeding in determining the alleged paternal 
ancestor’s heirs.360 The courts’ holdings, though, seem understandable 
in that, traditionally at least, real estate passes from the deceased 
titleholder to that person’s heirs “automatically” without any need for 
administration of the estate. But, there is another reason: land can 
always be found. Personal property may have been sold and its 
proceeds difficult to trace. Presumably, the now recognized surviving 
spouse could assert a claim to real estate that was part of the intestate 
estate of the deceased spouse even if no formal probate proceedings 
were held relating to the decedent’s estate. 
2. REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, AND 
HOMESTEAD ISSUES 
One conclusion that certainly seems indisputable is that the rights 
of the retroactively recognized spouse will not trump the rights of bona 
fide purchasers of property. This is a completely defensible result and 
certainly seems to comport with the limits that the bona fide purchaser 
principle placed on retroactivity in Reynoldsville Casket Co. The bona 
fide purchaser principle, which may be appropriately described as “a 
well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, 
which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant 
policy justifications,”361 is one of those principles which can provide 
finality in this particular context. The application of the bona fide 
 
 357.  Given the interplay between the law of intestacy and the law of wills, it 
would seem evident that the purpose, the principle, and the policy behind the creation 
of rules governing intestacy should theoretically coincide with the policy goals of the 
law of wills: each represent a different side of the same coin—the law of succession. 
Some scholars disagree on this point. For a discussion concerning this dialogue on the 
jurisprudence of laws of wills and laws of intestacy, see Lee-ford Tritt, Technical 
Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform 
Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 280–86 (2010).  
358.  See supra Part II.D.3–4. 
359.  See supra Part II.D.3–4. 
360.  Marshall v. Marshall, 670 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1984); Kau Agribusiness 
Co. v. Heirs of Assigns of Ahulau, 95 P.3d 613 (Haw. 2004). 
 361.  Id. at 759. 
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purchaser principle will probably resolve most claims involving real 
property in situations where now-recognized spouses have spousal 
rights in property that would have normally been conveyed to bona fide 
purchasers or has already been conveyed to such purchasers. At least to 
the extent real estate is involved,362 situations like this are most likely 
resolved by leaving the bona fide purchaser in possession of the 
property. However, proceeds of the sale of the property to the bona 
fide purchaser should be handled differently. The proceeds of sale 
should be traced through the estate (or the transferor) in order to satisfy 
any community property rights, homestead rights, or other marital 
property rights to which the previously unrecognized same-sex spouse 
now has legal right. 
a. Homestead Rights 
In many states, homestead rights are granted to a surviving spouse 
(and, in some states like Florida, to minor children as well).363 The 
homestead is not devisable—the surviving spouse has a vested property 
interest. In states where homestead property has a robust protection 
from creditor claims, does the spouse who held title before state 
recognition of the marriage still have legal rights to the home even 
though the state must now recognize the other spouse’s rights in the 
homestead?364 
Let’s change our example: Louise, Thelma, and J.D. moved to 
Florida instead of Texas. When they moved to Florida, Thelma bought 
a home with her own proceeds and then died without a will. After 
Thelma’s death, Louise wants to sell the home but Louise’s mother 
wants the home under Florida’s intestacy statutes. Pre-Obergefell, 
Louise will not be deemed a spouse under Florida law. J.D. may not be 
deemed to be Louise’s child because Louise never adopted him and 
 
 362.  And probably with regard to all property. 
 363.  In Florida, if a decedent is survived by a spouse and minor children, no 
devise of homestead is permitted; rather, the surviving spouse receives a life estate and 
the children receive a vested remainder interest. If all of the children are adults, the 
only permissible devise is a fee simple interest to the surviving spouse. See FLA. 
CONST. art. X, § 4(c).  
 364.  The problem in Florida is particularly acute. The Florida constitution 
allows the alienation of “homestead real estate by mortgage, sale or gift” only with the 
consent of the owner’s spouse, if the owner is married. Id. Nor is the homestead 
devisable. FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(1) (West 2010). The homestead cannot be devised if 
the person is survived by a spouse or a minor child or children, except if there are no 
minor children it may be devised to the spouse. Id. In every other case, the surviving 
spouse has a life estate in the homestead real property with a vested remainder in the 
decedent’s descendants per stirpes or, at the surviving spouse’s election within six 
months of the decedent’s death, an undivided one-half interest as tenant-in-common 
with the decedent’s descendants. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (West 2012). 
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relied instead on the marital presumption (which Florida probably 
would not recognize). If the house is distributed to the mother under 
Florida’s intestacy laws before the Obergefell decision, the court may 
be able to claw-back the property after the decision because the mother 
is not a bona fide purchaser. (At times, persons who receive 
distributions from estates have to return them.) If the mother (or the 
estate) subsequently sold the home to a bona fide purchaser, the 
problems presented by Florida homestead may be similarly simple to 
solve. Simply put, the bona fide purchaser of the homestead should be 
protected.  
Of course, the circumstances of the sale will probably be closely 
examined in any litigation to see if the purchaser is a good faith 
purchaser. For instance, one can easily imagine that some sales, even 
for full consideration, might be questioned if they occurred on the eve 
of the Obergefell decision or even on the eve of the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in Florida. Of course, based on the state cases 
following Trimble, property that passes in intestacy (including Florida 
homestead) may be subject to claims by Louise if the estate is still 
“open.”365 These transferred homestead issues could also include cases 
where no formal administration was ever had, and perhaps situations 
where the other heirs did not rely on existing law but somehow simply 
passively accepted the property. After Obergefell, J.D. may be deemed 
to be the child of Louise by the marital presumption. If J.D. was 
deemed to be a child of Louise, the home would have passed to J.D. 
but still would not pass to Louise. As the edits to our example show, 
determining homestead rights post-Obergefell is a fact-intensive 
process. While the example highlights broad generalizations of 
retroactively granting homestead rights, it would be impossible to 
determine how courts may generally return or deny the homestead 
rights of surviving, previously unrecognized same-sex spouses. 
b. Community Property 
Community property states have similar issues. Community 
property laws are given different operational effect in life than they are 
in death. In community property states, any property generated during 
marriage is considered community property and is subject to an equal 
division between the married spouses.366 The retroactive application of 
Obergefell presents many questions in the context of community 
property. For example, when did the same-sex married couples begin to 
accumulate community property in a non-recognition community 
 
365.  See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
366.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 766.31 (2015); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 10, at 512. 
932 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
property state? What is the current status of property that has been sold 
or conveyed when that property would have been considered 
community property had the marriage been recognized? It seems highly 
likely that a route similar to the homestead example is the path to 
resolving community property claims in this context. Tracing is the 
ultimate solution and will allow the now-recognized spouse to vindicate 
the rights afforded by marriage starting at the time the marriage was 
validly celebrated. Accordingly, the bona fide purchaser should keep 
possession of the property, while the proceeds of sale should be deemed 
community property and traced in the hands of the spouse or estate who 
disposed of the property. The proceeds of the sale of what should have 
been community property had the marriage been recognized at the time 
the property was acquired will remain community property and will 
have to be traced. However, that is a common occurrence in a 
community property system and will therefore not be a significant 
burden on any state. 
c. Tenancies-by-the-Entirety 
There are a number of factors that are implicated in states that 
have tenancy-by-the-entirety presumption—both lifetime and estate 
issues. 367  For instance, the presumption of a tenancy-by-the entirety 
directs how the property is transferred at the death of the first spouse. 
Lifetime issues include creditor issues against one of the spouses. 
Whether property is held as tenancy-by-the-entirety is pertinent to the 
creditors of one of the spouses because creditors’ rights in tenancies-by-
the-entirety property are usually limited, if not completely eliminated. 
Let’s say in our example, Louise and Thelma move to Florida and 
Thelma purchases their home in 2014, prior to the Obergefell decision. 
Under Florida law, if they were an opposite-sex couple the home would 
have been presumed to be held as a tenancy-by-the-entirety.368 As a 
same-sex couple, however, Louise and Thelma were deemed to be joint 
tenants with rights of survivorship. 369  Later in 2014, let’s further 
assume that Thelma is sued by a third party, loses the lawsuit, and a 
judgment is rendered against her. Thelma does not have enough assets 
in her own name to satisfy the judgment. Accordingly, a third party 
tries to attach the home as part of the judgment, thus trying to force a 
severance of the property. Thelma dies in early 2015, and a few months 
 
 367.  See, e.g., NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2 
(McKinney 2016) (stating that a conveyance to “persons not legally married to one 
another but who are described . . . as husband and wife creates a joint tenancy [with 
right of survivorship], unless expressly stated to be a tenancy in common”); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (West 2016). 
368.  FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (West 2016). 
369.  See id. 
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later Obergefell is decided. If Florida’s prohibition on recognizing 
same-sex couples from other states “never existed,” the house should 
be deemed to be a tenancy-by-the-entirety and the judgment could not 
be attached to the house. If the judgment has not been enforced, the 
house should be protected. If the judgment has been enforced, does 
Louise have any remedy? Could Louise try to reclaim the property or 
the proceeds of the property? Would Louise have any action against 
title insurers? It is unclear. Whether the attempted levy on the property 
came before or after state law recognition of the marriage is probably 
significant. Real estate and recorded titles, however, may be important 
as well. 
d. Potential Solution 
The issues concerning “open” and “closed” estates, homestead, 
community property, and tenancy-by-the-entirety rights may be 
resolved by a state passing a statute of repose. Following Trimble, 
Mississippi adopted a statute granting non-marital children three years 
to bring claims against their fathers’ estates.370 In essence, this statute 
of repose gave those whose interests were affected by a change in the 
law a limited, but satisfactory, amount of time to bring claims related to 
events that occurred before the change of law was announced.371 Giving 
surviving same-sex spouses an adequate fixed period of time to 
adjudicate any claims after the date of Obergefell would probably be 
fair to everyone involved, especially because the time period between 
the first valid same-sex marriages in the United States and the date of 
Obergefell is not long. In order to avoid due process issues, though, the 
statute of repose would have to be crafted to give the unrecognized 
same-sex spouses enough time to respond and provide some type of 
notice requirement. Of course, statutes like this may be too 
controversial in formally non-recognition states to pass. If passed, there 
could still be protracted litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
these statutes considering the potential losses incurred by same-sex 
surviving spouses. In the absence of such legislation, litigation will 
continue, but with less certainty in the outcomes. 
C. Retroactive Application of Obergefell to Current Cases 
The Obergefell decision had an immediate litigious effect. To date, 
recent cases have largely concerned retroactive death certificates, 
wrongful death actions, and retroactive common law marriage. It 
should be noted that these cases will implicate life insurance, social 
 
370.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15. 
371.  Id.  
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security, pensions, employee benefits, inheritance, and wrongful death 
judgments, among many other benefits and rights. 
For example, De Leon v. Abbot372 was filed prior to Obergefell and 
asked whether it was unconstitutional for Texas law to prohibit same-
sex marriages and prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages from 
other states. 373  The plaintiffs received a favorable ruling, and the 
district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from 
enforcing those laws.374 The state appealed and the court stayed the 
injunction. 375  Obergefell was decided while the appeal was under 
submission, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s ruling in accordance with Obergefell.376 After failed attempts to 
alter his spouse’s death certificate to include his name as surviving 
spouse, John Stone-Hoskins intervened in De Leon to enforce the 
injunction and have his late husband’s death certificate amended.377 In 
response to a court order granting Stone-Hoskin’s motion, 378  Texas 
Attorney General Ken Paxton and Governor Greg Abbott (Defendants) 
filed motions for reconsideration of the order and to quash the motion 
for contempt. 379  Defendants argued that the De Leon court’s order 
allowing the injunction was improper because “Stone-Hoskins seeks to 
raise a wholly separate claim based upon a legal question not at issue in 
DeLeon: whether the Vital Statistics Unit must go back to amend death 
certificates pre-dating the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision and the 
implementing order.”380 
Stone-Hoskins’ replied in a motion that likened the facts in 
Obergefell to the case at hand.381 The De Leon court upheld the order in 
 
372.  791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 373.  Id. at 624. 
 374.  Id. at 625. 
 375.  Id. 
 376.  Id. at 624–25. 
 377.  John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Emergency Motion to Intervene and for 
Contempt, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-
982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905859. 
 378.  Robert Wilonsky, Ken Paxton Could Be Held in Contempt for Refusing to 
Grant Same-Sex Death Certificate, DALLAS NEWS: THE SCOOP BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015, 
11:59 AM), http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2015/08/till-death-do-them-part-
except-in-texas-where-dying-man-sues-for-same-sex-death-certificate.html/ 
[https://perma.cc/7GEE-QPRF]. 
 379.  John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Emergency Motion, supra note 377. 
 380.  State Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Dated August 
5, 2015 at 3, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-
982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905841. 
 381.  John Allen Stone-Hoskins' Response to State Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Emergency Motion to Rescind or Quash, De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. 
Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-982-OLG), 2015 WL 5905814. 
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favor of Stone-Hoskins,382 allowing him to be recognized as surviving-
spouse and heir.383 
In another example, an Alabama court recently applied Obergefell 
retroactively to allow a surviving same-sex spouse to obtain the 
proceeds of a wrongful death action. In Hard v. Bentley,384 the plaintiff 
sought the proceeds of a wrongful death action through the laws of 
intestate succession as a surviving spouse. 385  The plaintiff’s lawful 
same-sex spouse was killed in a car crash in 2011, four years before the 
Obergefell decision.386 The court applied Obergefell retroactively and 
effectively ruled that the plaintiff could receive spousal rights from the 
estate.387 The plaintiff’s mother-in-law intervened as a defendant, and 
argued that the plaintiff was not a surviving spouse entitled to proceeds 
because Obergefell did not apply retroactively. 388  In this case, Pat 
Fancher, the decedent’s mother, appealed the decision to the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.389 Defendant argued that Obergefell cannot be 
applied retroactively and that Alabama law should apply to prevent the 
plaintiff from taking a share intestate.390 Defendant further pointed out 
that the Court’s opinion did not mention whether Obergefell had any 
sort of retroactive effect.391 Fancher contended that it was more likely 
that the Court intended Obergefell to be applied prospectively, arguing 
in part that: 
 
Obergefell cannot take retroactive effect because two cases, 
United States v. Windsor and Alabama Policy Institute v. 
King, stand in the way of retroactively reaching the events of 
2011 which created this case. Moreover, even if the 
Obergefell opinion were given retroactive as to some aspects 
of a marriage, Social Security benefits, insurance, etc., under 
 
 382.  Wilonsky, supra note 378. 
 383.  De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632. See Jake Whittenberg, Gay Military 
Widower Claims Victory After Landmark Decision, KING 5 NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:53 
AM), http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/2015/11/04/gay-widower-victory-va-
benefit/75147680/ [https://perma.cc/FFP2-TQ2J] (In Washington State, the state issued 
an amended death certificate listing a man who passed away in 2008 as married).  
384.  No. 2:13 CV-922-WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
 385.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Hard v. 
Bentley, No. 2:13 CV-922-WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
 386.  Id. at 1. 
 387.  See Intervening Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and 
Her Renewed Prayer for Relief at 10, Hard v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW-SRW 
(M.D. Ala. 2015). 
 388.  Id. at 3–4. 
 389.  See Principal Brief of Appellant Patricia Fancher, Hard v. Fancher, 648 
F. App’x 853 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-13836). 
 390.  Id. 
 391.  Id. at 14–17. 
936 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
well-established legal principles in Alabama it cannot have 
retroactive effect as it relates to the subject matter of this 
dispute- wrongful death proceeds- because the Alabama 
Supreme Court has strictly held that those awards vest 
according to the laws in effect at the time of one’s death, with 
no regard for whether or not the taker deserves the award, 
and with no regard given to the decedent’s possible desires.392 
 
The court denied Fancher’s motion in full and stood by its decision 
to apply Obergefell retroactively. 393  Hard v. Bentley makes a bold 
statement about the retroactive application of Obergefell, but only time 
will tell if states follow this court’s lead in recognizing the marital 
rights of same-sex couples and retroactively enforcing them following 
Obergefell. 
A few high profile Florida cases have redefined the state’s 
historically anti-gay jurisprudence. The recent Florida case of Doussett 
v. Florida Atlantic University394 applied Obergefell to recognize a same-
sex marriage for in-state tuition purposes. 395  In Doussett, Florida 
Atlantic University (FAU) refused to recognize the student plaintiff’s 
same-sex marriage and denied him in-state tuition.396 The plaintiff sued 
FAU and challenged a Florida statute that banned state agencies from 
recognizing same-sex marriages. 397  The Fourth District Court of 
Appeals held that Obergefell mandated recognition of the plaintiff’s 
same sex marriage.398 However, it is unclear whether the court intended 
the remedy to apply retroactively or proactively. Regardless, what can 
be seen here is a growing trend towards same-sex friendly 
jurisprudence, even in states that have traditionally been against the 
recognition of same-sex marriages. 
The continued influx of cases relating to same-sex marriage are 
forcing courts to consider whether they should retroactively recognize 
same-sex common law marriages in the wake of Obergefell. One such 
case, In re Underwood,399 occurred in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.400 
In Underwood, the court recognized the common-law marriage of two 
women as valid when one of the women passed away in 2013 prior to 
 
392.  Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 393.  Hard v. Attorney Gen., Ala., 648 Fed. App’x 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2016). 
394.  184 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
 395.  Id. 
 396.  Initial Brief of Appellant Gildas Dousset at 5–6, Dousset v. Fla. Atl. 
Uinv., 184 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (No. 4D14-480). 
 397.  Id. at 6–7. 
 398.  Dousset, 184 So. 3d 1133. 
399.  No. 2014-E0681-29, 2015 WL 5052382 (Pa. C.P. Orphans’ Ct. July 29, 
2015). 
400.  Id. 
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Pennsylvania’s recognition of same-sex marriages. 401  The decedent, 
Underwood, and her female spouse had held a religious ceremony, 
combined their wills, and named each other as beneficiaries. 402  The 
case arose when Underwood’s surviving spouse “sued United of 
Omaha, which had refused to pay her a spousal beneficiary payment, 
and Dearborn National Insurance Co., which had denied her a 
survivor’s benefit on disability payments Underwood had received.”403 
According to the court, Underwood and her spouse “entered into a 
valid and enforceable marriage, under Pennsylvania common law” that 
remained in effect until Underwood’s passing. 404  “Their marriage is 
valid and enforceable,” the court ruled, “and they are entitled to all 
rights and privileged of validly licensed married spouses in all respects 
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”405 
Similarly, in In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, 406  a Texas 
Probate Judge decided an inheritance dispute between Stella Powell’s 
siblings and her same-sex domestic partner.407 In 2008, Stella Powell 
and Sonemaly Phrasavath celebrated their marriage in Texas.408 Stella 
Powell passed away six years later in 2014.409 After failing to settle 
with Phrasavath, Stella’s three siblings filed suit and claimed heirship 
over Phrasavath. 410  Phrasavath responded with a countersuit for 
heirship and challenged Texas laws that banned the recognition of her 
marriage with Stella.411 
The decedent’s sibling’s argued that Phrasavath could not inherit 
because her common-law marriage was not valid under Texas law and 
she was free to legally marry anyone else.412 The siblings contended 
 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Zach Ford, Same-Sex Couples Are Securing Retroactive Recognition of 
Their Marriages, THINK PROGRESS (July 30, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/same-sex-
couples-are-securing-retroactive-recognition-of-their-marriages-
2270677a18f1#.nr3ygt4wd [https://perma.cc/WZ5Q-VV4V]. 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Underwood, 2015 WL 5052382. 
 405.  Id. 
 406.  No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cnty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014). 
 407.  Id.  
408.  Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance at 2, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C-1-
PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014). 
 409.  Id. at 1. 
 410.  Application for Determination of Heirship and Issuance of Letters of 
Independent Administration at 1, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-
001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Nov. 6, 2014). 
411.  See Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance, supra note 408. 
 412.  See Applicants James Powell and Alice Huseman’s Special Exceptions to, 
and Motion to Dismiss, Sonemaly Phrasavath’s (1) Contest to Applicants’ Application 
for Determination of Heirship and Issuance of Letters of Independent Administration 
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that the couple could not establish the requirement for common law 
marriage, despite the fact that they held themselves out as being 
married because “[a] couple cannot have a reputation in the community 
as being married when, at that time, that public status is not legally 
available to them or acknowledged.”413 The siblings also argued that 
allowing a common law marriage would undermine the decedent’s 
intent because “retroactively recognized common law marriage which 
was legally impossible while the decedent was alive does not look to the 
decedent’s intent.”414 Thus, they argued that to retroactively recognize 
the same-sex marriage would amount to overriding the intent of the 
decedent.415 In support of recognizing her marriage, Pharasavath argued 
that her relationship should qualify because it met all of the standards of 
a common law marriage.416 Parasavath argued that she and the decedent 
had an intimate relationship, joint financial status, both signed 
declaration of domestic partnership in 2008, and represented to others 
that they were married.417 
After considering all of the facts at hand, on February 17th, 2015, 
the Probate Judge denied the siblings’ attempt to block Parasavath as an 
heir. 418  The state of Texas petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus to 
challenge the Probate Judge’s order as an abuse of discretion.419 The 
State of Texas argued that the Probate Judge’s decision was overly 
broad and violated the laws of Texas. 420  However, the Obergefell 
decision was decided soon after the State of Texas appealed. After the 
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, the Powell court approved a 
settlement between the parties that recognized Phrasavath as Powell’s 
spouse and effectively granted her rights as an intestate heir. 421 
 
and (2) Counterapplication to Determine Heirship, for Appointment of Dependent 
Administrator and Issuance of Letters of Administration, In re Estate of Stella Marie 
Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Oct. 15, 2014). 
 413.  James Powell and Alice Huseman’s No Evidence Motion and Motion on 
the Pleadings for Summary Judgment at 6, In re Estate of Stella Marie Powell, No. C-
1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Aug. 25, 2015). 
 414.  Id. at 15. 
415.   Id. at 16. 
 416.  See Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Continuance, supra note 408. 
417.  Id. at 2.  
 418.  See Order on Special Exceptions and Motion to Dismiss, In re Estate of 
Stella Marie Powell, Case No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Feb. 
17, 2015).  
419.   Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4–6, In re State of Tex., Relator, No. 
15-0135 (Tex. Feb. 17, 2015). 
420.   Id. at 6, 9. 
421.   See Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement, In re Estate of Stella 
Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Sept. 11, 2015); 
see also Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement, In re Estate of Stella 
Marie Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. No. 1 Sept. 17, 2015). 
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In 2015, a Washington, D.C. court was asked to retroactively 
recognize a common law same-sex marriage. 422  In this case, the 
plaintiff and his same-sex partner were not legally married when the 
partner passed away. 423  The plaintiff claimed that a common law 
marriage existed between him and the decedent, therefore the court 
should retroactively recognize the common law marriage and grant him 
spousal rights in estate.424 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but 
the court denied the motion.425 Even though the case settled out of court 
soon after,426 the fact that the court denied the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss is a telling sign that state courts are beginning to see merit in 
these types of claims. Although the court here did not directly rely on 
Obergefell as a precedent, such rulings are indicative of a shift in state 
court jurisprudence regarding same-sex marriage following 
Obergefell.427 
D. The Beginning of a New Trend in Same-Sex Marriage Retroactivity? 
A similar issue that is becoming apparent in the wake of Obergefell 
is whether courts can retroactively “create” a marriage. Courts may 
find themselves tasked with determining whether they can, or should, 
retroactively declare a couple married to insure their entitlement to the 
benefits of marriage, when the couple was never legally married at the 
critical time period, and common law marriage was not recognized in 
 
 422.  See Lou Chibbaro Jr., Gay Man in Estate Dispute with Partner’s Family, 
WASHINGTON BLADE (June 25, 2015, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/06/25/gay-man-in-estate-dispute-with-partners-
family/ [https://perma.cc/ETL3-NE9T]; Lou Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay 
Common Law Marriage Denied, WASHINGTON BLADE (Aug. 28, 2015, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/08/28/motion-to-dismiss-gay-common-law-
marriage-case-denied/ [https://perma.cc/JU7G-H9CK]. 
 423.  See Chibbaro Jr., Gay Man in Estate Dispute, supra note 422. 
 424.  Id.; Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay Common Law Marriage 
Denied, supra note 422. 
 425.  Chibbaro Jr., Motion to Dismiss Gay Common Law Marriage Denied, 
supra note 422. 
 426.  Lou Chibbaro Jr., Settlement in D.C. Common Law Marriage Case, 
WASHINGTON BLADE (Dec. 1, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/12/01/settlement-in-d-c-common-law-marriage-
case/ [https://perma.cc/DC8Y-AKBB]. 
 427.  There are other examples of same-sex “marriage” being applied 
retroactively. For example, see Troy Masters, United States Government Says L.A. 
Couple’s 1975 Marriage is Valid, PRIDELA (June 7, 2016), 
https://thepridela.com/2016/06/united-states-government-says-gay-couples-1975-
marriage-is-valid/ [https://perma.cc/6VR3-ZFAP]. For another interesting retroactive 
judicial decision concerning the sweeping changes brought about by the Obergefell 
decision, see Henderson v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-00220-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 3548645 
(S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016). 
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the couple’s state of residence. Such a dilemma arises in cases where a 
same-sex couple would have married had it been legal, and later sought 
benefits of marriage only to be denied treatment as a married couple. 
Mueller v. Tepler428 is perhaps the most compelling and relevant 
case regarding the issue of same-sex marriage and access to benefits.429 
In Mueller, Plaintiffs Margaret Mueller and Charlotte Stacey brought a 
medical malpractice action against defendants Iris Wertheim and Iris 
Wertheim, M.D., LLC, seeking damages for personal injuries that 
Mueller suffered as a result of defendants’ negligence, and for Stacey’s 
resulting loss of consortium. 430  Mueller spent several years under 
Wertheim’s care after Wertheim mistakenly diagnosed her with the 
wrong type of cancer in 2001.431 By the time the error was discovered 
in 2005, Mueller’s cancer had progressed to a stage where some of the 
tumors could no longer be surgically removed.432 Mueller commenced 
her action against Wertheim in 2006, and filed a third amended 
complaint twenty-three months later alleging, in relevant part, that 
defendants were also liable to Stacey for loss of consortium.433 
The complication in the case was that Mueller and Stacey, 
although they had been domestic partners and resided together since 
1985, were not married or joined in a civil union at the time 
Wertheim’s error was made.434 In fact, it wasn’t until November 2005 
that Mueller and Stacey were joined in a civil union under Connecticut 
law.435 Based on these facts, the trial court granted defendants’ motion 
to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims on the grounds that “a 
consortium claim is not sustainable by people who are not either in a 
legal marriage or in a legal civil union at the time of the wrong.”436 
By the time plaintiffs filed their main brief in the appellate court, 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided that Connecticut’s state 
marriage laws were unconstitutional to the extent that they barred same-
sex couples from marrying in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public 
Health.437 In light of this decision, the plaintiffs’ contention was that 
same-sex spouses who would have been married had same-sex marriage 
been legal should be permitted to claim loss of consortium “when the 
sole reason that they were not legally married at the time of the 
 
428.  95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014). 
 429.  Id.  
 430.  Id. at 1014.  
 431.  Id. at 1015.  
 432.  Id. 
 433.  Id. 
 434.  Id. at 1015–16. 
 435.  Id. at 1015. 
 436.  Id. at 1016 (citing Mueller v. Tepler, 33 A.3d 814, 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2011)). 
 437.  957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
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underlying tortious conduct was a now repudiated public policy against 
legal recognition of lifelong same-sex relationships.”438 The appellate 
court, however, affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the 
plaintiffs’ situation was no different than that of an opposite-sex couple 
who were not married at the time that the underlying tort occurred, and 
thus a cause of action for loss of consortium was not available.439 
The case made its way to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 
where it was reversed.440 The court held that the “intangible elements” 
of the relationship of a same-sex couple who would have been married 
when the underlying tort occurred, had such a union been legal, are the 
same “intangible elements” of a relationship in marriage. 441 
Additionally, the court noted that where marriage is not an option, it 
cannot logically serve as a proxy for the existence of the commitment 
that “gives rise to the existence of consortium . . . in the first instance . 
. . .”442 Perhaps most importantly, the court concluded that: 
 
[I]f a member of a same sex couple can prove that the couple 
would have been married when the underlying tort occurred 
if not for the fact that they were barred from doing so, it 
would be illogical and unfair to characterize a marriage after 
the tort occurred as a marriage to “a cause of action” . . . 
instead of the formalization of a relationship that already had 
given rise to “the existence of consortium” . . . and already 
had all of the hallmarks of a marriage.443 
 
Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the common-
law claim for loss of consortium should be expanded “to couples who 
were not married when the tortious act occurred, but who would have 
been married if the marriage had not been barred by state law.”444 
Similarly, in Conover v. Conover, 445  the Maryland Court of 
Appeals recently reversed the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ 
refusal to give any weight to the argument that the court should 
consider that a couple could not legally marry at the time of the events 
causing the dispute. 446  Conover involved a child custody dispute 
between Michelle and Brittany Conover, who were in the midst of a 
 
 438.  Mueller, 95 A.3d at 1018. 
 439.  Id. at 1016. 
 440.  Id. at 1014. 
 441.  Id. at 1025–26. 
 442.  Id. at 1026. 
 443.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 444.  Id. at 1023.  
 445.  120 A.3d 874 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015). 
 446.  Conover v. Conover, No. 79, Sept. Term, 2015, 2016 WL 3633062 (Md. 
Ct. App. 2016 July 7, 2016). 
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divorce following their 2010 marriage and subsequent separation. 447 
Before the parties were wed, they discussed having a child together, 
and agreed that Brittany would be artificially inseminated from an 
anonymous donor.448 In 2009, the child was conceived.449 In March of 
2010, the District of Columbia, where the couple resided at the time, 
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 450  That April, 
Brittany gave birth to a son.451 The birth certificate listed Brittany as the 
mother, but identified no one as the father.452 Brittany and Michelle 
were married in the District of Columbia on September 28, 2010.453 
The couple separated one year later in September 2011.454 Brittany 
filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in June of 2013, which did not 
mention the child. 455  The custody dispute arose when Michelle 
subsequently filed both an answer and a Counter-Complaint for 
Absolute Divorce, in which she requested visitation rights with respect 
to the child.456 The circuit court issued an opinion in June of 2013, in 
which the court found that Michelle was not the child’s “father” and 
therefore could not establish parental standing.457 The court noted that a 
child born during the marriage was presumed to be the child of both 
parties, but concluded that this presumption was not applicable in this 
case because the child was conceived and born before the marriage.458 
No credence was given to the argument that the parents could not be 
legally married in Washington, D.C. at the time of conception, but the 
court did note that the couple could have married before the child’s 
birth, as Washington, D.C. began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples one month before the child was born.459 The trial court held 
that in order for Michelle to overcome the biological mother’s 
constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of 
her child, she would have to show that Brittany was unfit or that there 
existed exceptional circumstances since the court viewed Michelle as a 
“third party.”460 The court concluded that Michelle “is in fact a female, 
had not adopted the child, and in no way was related to the child, thus 
 
 447.  Conover, 120 A.3d at 876–77.  
 448.  Id. 
 449.  Id. at 877.  
 450.  Id. 
 451.  Id. 
 452.  Id. 
 453.  Id. 
 454.  Id. 
 455.  Id. 
 456.  Id. 
 457.  Id. at 878. 
 458.  Id. 
 459.  Id. 
 460.  Id. at 878–79. 
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not sufficiently establishing that she could be the ‘father’ of the 
child.”461 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court, holding that Michelle did not have parental standing to 
challenge the denial of visitation or custody of the child. 462  Several 
factors played into the court’s decision. First, the court dispelled with 
Michelle’s argument that she was “denied” the benefit of the 
presumption that a child born or conceived during a marriage is the 
legitimate child of both spouses, because there was no evidence as to 
why the couple chose 2009 for the conception of the child.463 Second, 
although the change in Washington, D.C.’s marriage law did not take 
effect until March 2010, at least three states (Connecticut, Iowa, and 
Massachusetts) permitted same-sex marriage in 2009, and the couple 
could have married before the birth of the child, but chose not to.464 
Finally, the court rejected Michelle’s argument that she relied on 
Brittany’s representations that Michelle was a parent to the child, 
because Michelle had several years to pursue the adoption of the child 
and formalize the parental relationship.465 
While the court noted that the case was a sad one, it concluded that 
Maryland law left them no choice, and that the question was better 
considered by the state legislature than by the courts.466 Ultimately, the 
deciding factor may have been that the couple waited until after the 
child’s birth to consummate their marriage. 467  Had the couple been 
married before the child’s conception or birth, the case likely would 
have been decided differently.468 
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Court of 
Special Appeals’ decision. The court held that de facto parents have 
standing to contest custody or visitation and need not show parental 
unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can apply a 
best interests of the child analysis.469 
A unanimous appellate court in New York held similarly in In re 
Estate of Leyton.470  In Leyton, the issue of retroactivity arose when 
relatives of the decedent sought to revoke a will that decedent executed 
 
 461.  Id. at 879. 
 462.  Id. at 880. 
 463.  Id. at 883. 
 464.  Id. 
 465.  Id. at 885. 
 466.  Id. at 886. 
 467.  Id. at 883. 
 468.  Id. 
 469.  Id. at 886. 
 470.  In re Estate of Leyton, 135 A.D. 3d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).  
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in 2001.471 The will named the decedent’s same-sex partner as executor 
of the estate and granted him significant bequests.472 In 2002, the couple 
had a commitment ceremony in New York, which at the time was 
without legal effect because same-sex marriage did not exist in New 
York until the 2011 enactment of the Marriage Equality Act.473 The 
couple later separated in 2010 and the decedent died in 2013 without 
executing a new will.474 The decedent’s relatives sought to have the 
former partner disqualified as executor and the bequests to him revoked 
on the theory that the former partner should be treated as a former 
spouse whose nomination as executor and gifts under the will are 
revoked by statute upon “divorce” or legal separation. 475  The 
Surrogate’s Court of New York County ordered, and the appellate 
court later affirmed, that “according the union between decedent and 
[his partner] retroactive legal effect would be inconsistent with their 
understanding that they had never been legally married.”476 
The appellate court even went so far as to declare that the 
“Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex couples’ fundamental right 
to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges does not compel a retroactive 
declaration that the commitment ceremony entered into by decedent and 
[his partner] in 2002, when same-sex marriage was not recognized 
under New York law, was a legally valid marriage.”477 
Issues similar to these are appearing frequently in a variety of 
practice areas.478 
 
 471.  In re Estate of Leyton, No. 2013-4842, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sur. Ct. June 16, 2015).  
 472.  Id. 
 473.  Id. 
 474.  In re Estate of Leyton, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1. 
 475.  Id. 
 476.  In re Estate of Leyton, 135 A.D.3d 418, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). 
 477.  Id. 
 478.  See, e.g., In re Villaverde, 540 B.R. 431 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(holding that a same-sex couple who entered civil union but did not marry cannot file 
joint petition in bankruptcy); Celec v. Edinboro Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 651 (W.D. Pa. 
2015) (surviving same-sex partner denied life insurance benefits); Bone v. St. Charles 
Cty. Ambulance Dist., No. 4:15CV912 RLW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123207 (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 16, 2015) (spouse denied health insurance benefits before Obergefell); Marie 
v. Mosier, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (D. Kan. 2015) (tax filings by same-sex couples must 
be permitted); Taylor v. Brasuell, No. 1:14-CV-00273-REB, 2015 WL 4139470 (D. 
Idaho July 9, 2015) (holding that a same-sex spouse would be permitted to be buried 
with her deceased spouse in veterans’ cemetery where previous permission had been 
denied). Courts have even gone so far as to look back to the original date of co-
habitation when determining an equitable distribution formula upon divorce of a same-
sex couple who were denied marriage by the laws of their estate. See In the Matter of 
Munson & Coralee Beal, No. 2015-0253, 2016 WL 4411308 (N.H. Aug. 19, 2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
The implications of Obergefell concerning the unconstitutionality 
of state laws that prohibited the recognition of otherwise valid same-sex 
marriages from sister states has been largely ignored. Yet, the potential 
application of the Court’s holding to choice-of-law matters and to 
remedial considerations concerning previously unrecognized same-sex 
spouses will have substantive financial effects across the entire 
spectrum of legal fields—for, with marriage, comes wide-ranging rights 
and obligations. Moreover, the practical relevance of many of these 
marital rights and obligations are inescapably intertwined with the 
length of the marriage. Though far reaching, the decision will 
predominately impact the realm of state property laws.  
Unfortunately—and perhaps intentionally—the Obergefell decision 
provided no guidance on its retroactive application. In an effort to fill 
that jurisprudential chasm, this Article articulates and defends a rich 
positive and normative jurisprudential framework through which courts 
and legislatures might analyze the rapidly growing number of real 
property and property succession disputes that continue to be initiated 
in the wake of the Obergefell decision. In the end, this Article 
concludes that, on balance, Obergefell should be applied purely 
retroactively as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial 
considerations, to the extent that adequate remedies may be fashioned 
to protect innocent third parties while rectifying the property 
deprivations of unconstitutionally unrecognized marriages. 
Accordingly, this Article provides a guiding source on the practical 
implications that will stem from Obergefell’s retroactive application. 
